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A MORAL MANDATE & THE MEANING OF CHOICE: 
CONCEIVING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AFTER NFIB 
BRIETTA CLARK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In July 2012, the Supreme Court issued one of its most anticipated 
decisions in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB)1 
–– the constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA).2 One of the ACA’s primary goals is to improve access to 
healthcare through expansions of public and private insurance.3 A focal 
point of the private insurance expansion in political and legal debates has 
been the “individual coverage requirement” or “mandate.” This is a 
requirement that individuals either purchase a qualified insurance plan or 
make an annual shared responsibility payment (also referred to as a 
“penalty”). Proponents and opponents alike have viewed this “mandate” as 
critical to the fate of reform.4 
The ACA tries to expand private insurance coverage in a number of 
ways: it increases consumer protections, like prohibiting insurers from 
denying policies based on one’s preexisting condition; it replaces 
individualized risk rating with community rating so that people are charged 
the same regardless of their individual risk or conditions, making insurance 
 
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. J.D. University of Southern California Law 
School; B.A. University of Chicago. The author would like to extend a special thanks to the St. 
Louis University Center for Health Law Studies for the opportunity to present this paper at the 
30th Anniversary Symposium, Health Reform: The Act, Decision and Election. This paper 
benefitted from wonderful conversations with the symposium’s participants, including Thomas 
Greaney, Mark Hall, Timothy Jost, Paul Starr, and Sidney Watson, as well as from 
conversations with David DePianto and Adam Zimmerman. All errors are mine alone. The 
author would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Health Law and Policy, and 
especially Katherine Ledden, Editor-in-Chief. 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB]. 
 2. Pub.L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in various sections 
of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA]. 
 3. The ACA relies on a host of provisions designed to reduce cost, improve the quality of 
healthcare and health outcomes, and expand access to care. See generally H.R. 3590, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
 4. See infra Part II (focusing on the mandate in the dominant political and legal narrative 
around reform). 
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more affordable for those who need it the most; it strengthens regulation of 
insurance rates to prevent unjustified rate increases; it provides subsidies 
based on income; and it creates new individual and small business 
insurance markets in which consumers can easily compare and enroll in 
insurance plans that are affordable and guarantee a minimum package of 
essential health benefits.5 For this to work, policymakers believed that a 
mandate was necessary to prevent people from waiting until they become 
sick before buying insurance and to ensure that enough healthy people 
would be part of the insurance pool in order to help spread the risk.6 
Without a mandate, requiring insurance companies to cover everyone at the 
same price, regardless of risk, would expose insurers to potentially 
exorbitant costs and would lead to a “death spiral” of insurers fleeing the 
market, undermining the ACA’s access goals.7 
For opponents, the mandate served as a catalyst for attacks on “big 
government.” Forcing citizens to buy insurance from private health insurers 
was controversial across the ideological spectrum. But, for those seeking to 
narrow federal power in the name of federalism, this mandate was seen as 
a compelling example of the federal government’s threat to personal liberty. 
Considered to be a novel exercise of federal power, the mandate also 
generated widespread legal debate about whether it was an appropriate use 
of Congress’ commerce power –– the legal focal point of challengers and 
defenders of the law. Congress and the Obama Administration asserted the 
commerce power as its primary legal justification for the law; according to 
the government, the mandate was an essential link and a necessary and 
proper part of an overarching regulatory scheme to solve a growing 
uninsurance problem that significantly impacted interstate commerce. 
Opponents, on the other hand, saw this as a viable opportunity to assert 
 
 5. For a comprehensive overview of the ACA, see KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF 
NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW (2011) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW], available 
at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf; see also Brietta Clark, Safeguarding 
Federalism by Saving Health Reform: Implications of NFIB, 46 LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(describing the private insurance reforms). 
 6. See I.R.C. § 5000A (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2011); see also Ariane de Vogue, 
Obama Administration Forcefully Defends Health Care Law’s Individual Mandate, ABCNEWS 
(Jan. 6, 2012, 6:42 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/obama-administra 
tion-forcefully-defends-individual-mandate/. 
 7. See Steve O’Keefe, Health Insurance Death Spiral, HEALTH CARE COMPACT BLOG (Jun. 
26, 2012), http://healthcarecompact.org/blog/2012-06-26/health-insurance-death-spiral; 
Ezra Klein, The Importance of the Individual Mandate, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2009) 
available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezraklein/2009/12/draft_1.html. But see LARRY 
LEVITT & GARY CLAXTON, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IS A DEATH SPIRAL INEVITABLE IF THERE IS NO 
MANDATE? (2012), available at http://policyinsights.kff.org/2012/june/is-a-death-spiral-inevit 
able-if-there-is-no-mandate.aspx. 
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more robust Tenth Amendment limits on a commerce power that was 
already too expansive. 
A counter narrative developed during this time that challenged both the 
mandate label and the assumption that the commerce power was the right 
legal justification.8 A handful of scholars and policymakers criticized the 
“mandate” label as misleading, highlighting the fact that the law actually 
gives people a legal choice to buy insurance or pay the assessment. A few 
legal scholars argued that this legal choice, in fact, made the assessment 
look like a tax on the choice not to buy insurance, and thus could be 
justified under the taxing power. This counter narrative got comparatively 
little attention in the mainstream debates about reform until the Court issued 
its NFIB decision.9 
Despite the overwhelming focus on whether the mandate was a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’ commerce power, the Court upheld the 
individual coverage provision as a valid exercise of Congress’ power to 
tax.10 Central to the Court’s decision was a struggle over the proper 
conception of the challenged provision: Was it a mandate to buy insurance 
enforced through a penalty that must be justified by the commerce power, 
or could it be viewed as a tax on the choice not to buy insurance that could 
be more easily justified by the broader power to tax and spend? 
The Court did not explicitly resolve the tension in these competing 
conceptions. Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts 
treated both interpretations as reasonable for purposes of the constitutional 
analysis despite the fact that every justice on the Court seemed to be more 
persuaded by the dominant view –– that this was a mandate with penalty. 
The Court’s decision to uphold the “mandate” under the taxing power 
depended on a functional analysis of the coverage requirement that 
ultimately defied this mandate characterization, however. Roberts explained 
that the shared responsibility payment functioned more like a tax because 
people retained a genuine choice under the law; no one would really be 
compelled to buy insurance. As a constitutional matter, this looked like other 
taxes used to regulate behavior previously upheld by the Court, such as “sin 
taxes” on tobacco intended to encourage people to quit smoking.11 
The Court’s reasoning drew significant criticism, even from reform 
supporters, because of what some viewed as confusing and illogical 
 
 8. See infra Part III for a more detailed description of this counter narrative. 
 9. Throughout the paper, I refer to the dominant view as the “mandate with penalty” 
frame, or I use the terms “mandate” or “penalty” as shorthand. To refer to the counter 
narrative, I use the phrases “tax on choice” and “taxing choice” interchangeably, and use the 
terms “tax” or “choice” as shorthand. 
 10. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the Court’s decision in NFIB. 
 11. 132 S. Ct. at 2596. See also infra Part IV.A. 
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reasoning that failed to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the 
mandate and choice frames.12 More importantly, however, the Court’s 
decision to uphold the “mandate” under the taxing power refocused our 
attention on practical questions about the potential for reform’s success now 
that NFIB has paved the way for implementation. If sin taxes, such as those 
intended to discourage people from smoking, have not proven effective at 
influencing behavior, how effective can a similar approach be for 
encouraging individuals to buy insurance? NFIB may have saved the law 
from constitutional challenge, but its reasoning underscores an equally 
serious structural challenge in implementation –– the role of individual 
choice. 
There was remarkably little discussion about consumers’ choice in the 
private insurance expansion before NFIB made clear that the ACA preserves 
a legal choice for people to decide whether to buy insurance because the 
amount of the “tax” or “penalty” is not significant or punitive enough to 
undermine this choice. But punitive legal and economic sanctions are not 
the only tools used by the federal government to influence behavior. The 
compulsory rhetoric in the linguistic architecture of the ACA, as well as in 
the government’s defense of the law, may have an expressive power to 
influence this choice in ways that are difficult to predict or quantify. The 
federal government, in conjunction with many states, is using the ACA as an 
expressive platform to espouse evolving public values and social norms that 
treat healthcare as an essential human and societal good. This message 
also underscores a new moral obligation shared by all –– government, 
employers, providers, insurers, and individuals –– to participate in a system 
that ensures everyone can access this good. 
Although the ACA does not effect a radical transformation of the 
healthcare system, its success depends on this transformative idea of shared 
responsibility. The ACA may not have created a true legal mandate, but this 
Article argues that it attempts to create a “moral mandate” for individuals to 
do their part by obtaining insurance.13 An understanding of this expressive 
 
 12. See infra Part IV.B. 
 13. The focus of this article is on the importance of consumers’ participation in the 
individual market through the newly created exchange because this is where broad and 
diverse consumer participation – particularly by “healthy” consumers – is important for risk 
spreading that helps keep insurance premiums affordable for everyone. The challenge of 
ensuring consumer participation also arises in the public insurance context, though with 
different implications. In that case, the focus is on the health and financial risk of individuals 
who fail to get important preventive or regular care that can prevent more expensive crises 
later, as well as insuring against the financial risks borne by providers and individuals in the 
event of unpredictable, catastrophic events. Individuals may fail to enroll in free public 
insurance programs for a number of reasons, including stigma, fear of immigration-related 
scrutiny if the individual lives in a mixed-status household, frustration from prior bad 
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characteristic of the ACA helps to explain the Court’s struggle to reconcile 
the apparent contradiction of the tax and penalty conceptions of the ACA’s 
coverage provision. More importantly, it helps us understand and critique 
the federal government’s attempt to leverage this expressive power to ensure 
the consumer participation essential to reform. NFIB affirms the idea that 
people will have a legal choice under the law. But can the federal 
government, through the ACA, define the meaning of this choice in a way 
that influences people to make the right one? 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II documents the dominant political 
and legal narrative which focused on the individual mandate as key to the 
reform’s fate in the Supreme Court and in implementation. Part III discusses 
the counter narrative developed by scholars, such as Akhil Amar, Jack 
Balkin, Neil Siegel, and Robert Cooter, which challenged the mandate 
frame. Although most scholars treated the “taxing choice” frame as 
providing an additional or alternative legal justification for the mandate, 
Siegel and Cooter directly confronted the tension presented by these 
competing narratives. They acknowledged the hybrid character of the ACA 
coverage provision as having tax-like and penalty-like characteristics, and 
provided the most robust discussion of the threshold question of how to 
classify the provision for constitutional purposes. 
Part IV considers the Court’s taxing power holding in NFIB, in light of the 
competing narratives shaping the debate before the decision. This holding 
generated dissatisfaction because of its failure to engage the threshold 
question of whether the coverage requirement was really a mandate with 
penalty or a tax on choice. This was especially problematic given that the 
frame chosen proved to be outcome determinative for Chief Justice Roberts, 
the swing vote in the case.14 This failure highlights the tension created by the 
juxtaposition of a legal choice and an expressive mandate in the ACA. 
Cooter and Siegel’s theory of how to treat such hybrid exactions helps fill in 
some of the analytical gaps in the Court’s reasoning and provides support 
for the Court’s taxing power holding. Ultimately, however, their theory still 
leaves unanswered a fundamental question about how individuals exercise 
 
experiences with government welfare agencies, and/or challenges navigating a difficult and 
complex bureaucracy for determining eligibility. 
 14. The choice of framing did not appear to be outcome determinative for the other 
Justices or for most legal scholars considering the merits under both the taxing and interstate 
commerce powers. See Randy Barnett, The Unprecedented Uniqueness of Chief Justice 
Roberts’ Opinion, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 5, 2012, 5:14 PM), http://www.volokh.com/ 
2012/07/05/the-unprecedented-uniqueness-of-chiefjustice-roberts-opinion/. Nonetheless, a 
number of scholars and lower courts have reinforced the notion that the characterization could 
be determinative by describing the taxing power as much broader and easier to satisfy than 
the commerce clause. See infra Part II. 
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choice, which is relevant to the constitutional question and predictions of 
reform success. 
Adopting a taxing choice frame assumes certain behavioral 
characteristics of potential consumers in the new health exchanges. The 
remaining part of this Article argues that the reasoning in NFIB, and in 
Cooter and Siegel’s article, turns on predictions about these new 
consumers’ behavior that may overvalue the significance of economic 
sanctions in consumer decision-making, while devaluing the potential 
expressive effect of the law’s moral mandate. Part V describes more fully this 
expressive effect of law. Expressive law theorists have long noted that law 
may influence people to comply with legal and social norms even in the 
absence of legal enforcement or meaningful economic sanctions. Once one 
understands the mandate/penalty frame as an expressive characteristic or 
message of the ACA, it cannot be dismissed merely as a label or political 
rhetoric. The ACA’s expressive characteristics should be taken more 
seriously because of the potential for transforming norms and influencing 
consumer behavior. The constitutional question has been decided, and the 
Court may have had good reason for ignoring the law’s potential expressive 
effect, but reform implementation is now underway, and consumer 
participation is critical.15 As a policy matter, it is important to consider the 
potential benefits and challenges of an approach that depends so heavily 
on expressive force, rather than legal or economic sanctions, to influence 
behavior. 
To this end, Part VI considers the potential effect of the ACA’s expressive 
mandate. Section A describes the harmful messaging and norms arising out 
of a fragmented system and a loosely regulated individual insurance market 
pre-ACA. Section B then considers how the federal government, through the 
ACA, is using its expressive power to create a new legal and social norm 
that obligates people to buy insurance. It is attempting to counter harmful 
pre-ACA norms with new messages of shared responsibility, including a 
robust role for government in protecting consumers and ensuring affordable 
care. It is educating the public about the societal costs of the uninsurance 
problem and the need for collective participation to solve this problem. And 
it is trying to instill in individuals a moral obligation to the collective to 
participate in this new insurance market. Section C considers more 
specifically how and why the ACA’s expressive messages may cause people 
to buy insurance. Whether legal choice in the ACA ultimately undermines 
reform goals will depend, in part, on how effectively the federal government 
 
 15. For updates on the status of health reform implementation in the states, see State 
Actions to Implement the Health Benefit Exchange, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health-benefit-ex 
ch.aspx (last updated February 18, 2013). 
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uses its expressive power to define the moral content of this choice, and how 
many people embrace the ACA mandate as the new moral norm. 
II.  CENTRALITY OF THE “MANDATE” IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL NARRATIVES OF 
REFORM 
A. Models of Reform Pre-ACA 
Even before health reform was written, a central question and focal 
point of debate was whether or not to include an individual mandate to buy 
insurance. In the Democratic Primary Campaign for the 2008 election, it 
was then-Senator Obama who attacked it and used it to distinguish his 
approach from then-Senator Clinton’s plan.16 Obama decried the individual 
mandate because he was convinced that people wanted insurance and 
government would not have to coerce them into it. Government simply had 
to use its regulatory power to create a fair, level playing field for those 
traditionally excluded from the market by guaranteeing people access to 
affordable and meaningful coverage. 
Not long after the election, however, President Obama became 
persuaded about the importance of a mandate. Obama’s healthcare reform 
would preserve a private market system that depended on the participation 
of private insurers. Without a mandate to guarantee a sizable enough pool 
of healthy people for the new market, insurers might suffer exorbitant costs 
and leave the market, causing a “death spiral” that would erode insurance 
options for everyone in the individual market.17 Similar health reform 
experiments by states that did not incorporate a mandate bore this out.18 By 
contrast, Massachusetts, which relied on a system of combined benefits and 
mandatory participation, achieved the kind of success that eluded other 
states.19 
Although it became clear that some kind of mandatory participation 
would be needed, policymakers and legal scholars debated the exact 
structure and design of the system. Anticipating significant opposition and 
legal challenges to health reform, the Administration gave careful 
consideration to the legal implications of different approaches it could take. 
 
 16. See Andrew Cline, How Obama Broke His Promise on Individual Mandates, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/how-obama-
broke-his-promise-on-individualmandates/259183/. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See NEERA TANDEN & TOPHER SPIRO, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE CASE FOR THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IN HEALTH CARE REFORM: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1-2 
(2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/02/ 
pdf/individual_mandate.pdf. 
 19. See id. 
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In 2008, Georgetown Law School’s O’Neill Institute, in conjunction with the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, commissioned a series of papers to 
propose solutions to possible legal issues that posed challenges to 
healthcare reform, titled “Legal Solutions in Health Care.”20 As part of this 
project, Professor Mark Hall provided an overview of the possible 
constitutional challenges and likely outcomes to various aspects of the 
private insurance expansion, including the individual mandate.21 
In his paper, Hall identified two possible mechanisms the Administration 
could use to achieve participation by individuals in the new markets being 
created: one would be through a tax on the failure to buy insurance (called 
a “play or pay” approach), and the other would be through a direct 
mandate to buy insurance that would be enforced through some kind of 
financial penalty.22 Hall described both of these mechanisms as legislating a 
kind of insurance mandate, but he distinguished the commerce clause 
justification of a “mandate” from the taxing power justification of a “play or 
pay” approach.23 Hall noted that although the “play or pay” approach 
differed somewhat from the U.S. Social Security System, it was well 
supported by federal constitutional precedent. He also concluded that the 
“‘play or pay’ option [would be] a bit safer because it would avoid any 
realistic possibility of attacking compulsory insurance as a denial of due 
process or an unjustified taking of property.”24 Thus prior to enactment, the 
taxing “play or pay” scheme and the mandate with penalty were viewed as 
alternative approaches to reform triggering distinct legal analyses. 
Early versions of the bill also revealed lawmakers’ ambivalence about 
the right approach to take, with some versions referring to the mechanism 
used to ensure participation as a “tax” and others referring to it as a 
“penalty.”25 Eventually, they adopted language that characterized insurance 
 
 20. For access to the papers commissioned for this project, see Legal Solutions in Health 
Reform, O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L & GLOBAL HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/national-health-law/legal-solutions-in-health-
reform/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
 21. MARK HALL, O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L & GLOBAL HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATES TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE (2009), available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/national-health-law/legal-solutions-in-health-re 
form/Papers/Individual_Mandates.pdf. 
 22. Id. at 3, 7 (“We also assume that such mandates are enforced through financial 
penalties, such as tax assessments or, at most, civil fines, but not through criminal law that 
would result in imprisonment (or probation), absent some other criminal act (such as tax fraud 
or evasion).”). 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. Id. at 7, 15-16. 
 25. See Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Dec 18, 2012), available at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/health_insur 
ance_and_managed_care/health_care_reform/index.html (giving an overview of the 
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coverage as mandatory: the key provision is titled “Requirement to maintain 
minimum essential coverage” and it provides that “an applicable individual 
shall . . . ensure that the individual . . . is covered.”26 Moreover, those 
subject to the requirement who fail to get coverage have to pay an 
assessment labeled as a “shared responsibility payment,”27 also referred to 
throughout the law as a “penalty.”28 President Obama abandoned his anti-
mandate campaign position to embrace the mandate as a critical element 
of health reform –– or so it appeared. 
B. Dominant Narrative of Challenges to the ACA 
After the ACA’s passage, it became clear that the mandate would be the 
focal point for political and legal attacks on reform.29 Politically, opponents 
of reform viewed the “mandate” as a lightning rod to stoke federalist and 
public fears of a federal intrusion into every aspect of our personal lives that 
would ultimately destroy civilization as we know it.30 Such rhetoric was not 
only used in the popular media and at town halls, it also made it into legal 
briefs and court decisions making dire predictions of a parade of horribles 
that would result if the mandate were upheld: 
[T]he federal government will have the absolute and unfettered power to 
create complex regulatory schemes to fix every perceived problem 
imaginable and to do so by ordering private citizens to engage in 
affirmative acts, under penalty of law, such as taking vitamins, losing weight, 
joining health clubs, buying a GMC truck, or purchasing an AIG insurance 
policy, among others. The term “Nanny State” does not even begin to 
describe what we will have wrought if in fact the Health Care Reform Act 
 
legislative and political development of health reform); see also Side-by-Side Comparison of 
Major Health Care Reform Proposals, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://www.kff.org/healthreform/ 
sidebyside.cfm (last updated Jun. 18, 2010). 
 26. I.R.C. § 5000A & 5000A(a) (2011) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091 
(2011) (“Requirement to maintain essential coverage; findings”). 
 27. I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2011). 
 28. Id. Several subsections of § 5000A refer to the shared responsibility payment as a 
penalty. For example, § 5000A(b)(1) imposes a penalty on applicable individuals for failure to 
meet the minimum coverage requirement; § 5000A (b)(2) explains the method by which a 
taxpayer pays the penalty; (b)(3) describes joint liability for dependents and spouses who file 
joint tax returns; § 5000A(c) describes the amount of the penalty; and § 5000A(e) provides 
certain exemptions from the penalty. 
 29. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER PUBLIC OPINION: A SNAPSHOT OF PUBLIC OPINION 
ON THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 2 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/ 
8296.pdf (noting that “while the mandate is the least popular provision of the law, it is also 
the most widely recognized”). 
 30. See Clark, supra note 5, pt II. 
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falls within any imaginable governmental authority. To be sure, George 
Orwell’s 1984 will be just the primer for our new civics.31 
These arguments reflected a recurring theme of federal power as a 
threat to individual liberty. Reform opponents viewed the coverage 
requirement as an infringement on the right to make one’s own decisions, 
on the right to be free from compulsory participation in a socialized medical 
system, and on religious liberty.32 Even supporters of reform generally 
objected to the idea of the mandate because it was viewed as a transfer of 
wealth to the private insurance companies seen as untrustworthy, the cause 
of many problems in the existing healthcare market, and whose troublesome 
antics had been used by President Obama to galvanize support for reform.33 
Notably, the federal government’s political response was not to counter 
the “mandate” narrative, but rather to defend the mandate as essential to 
addressing a compelling problem in a way that still preserves some choice. 
The choice President Obama emphasized, though, was the ability to choose 
among different plans in a new and improved individual insurance market.34 
By contrast, having insurance was consistently and emphatically described 
as a requirement of the new law. In light of his prior position and the 
political and legal controversy the mandate generated, Obama could 
certainly have soft-pedaled this description. The law contains a number of 
exemptions, but Obama did not highlight these; rather he made clear that 
those who can afford to buy insurance should and must do so. Obama also 
could have used a phrase like “play or pay” to emphasize the choice people 
would have between paying the assessment and buying insurance; but this 
approach was apparently rejected in favor of the harsher mandate/penalty 
rhetoric. In speeches and town halls, Obama repeatedly embraced the 
mandate/penalty framework, using it to explain to the public how this new 
 
 31. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & Brief in Support at 17-18, Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-11156 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2010). 
 32. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 632-33 (2010); Abigail R. 
Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian 
Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyond, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 288, 288-91 (2012). 
 33. See Avik Roy, Once Upon a Time, Liberals Hated the Individual Mandate, FORBES 
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/04/02/once-upon-a-time-liberals-
hated-the-individual-mandate/; Timothy Noah, Lefties Against Reform: A Taxonomy of Left-
Liberal Opposition to the Health Care Bill, SLATE 2 (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/prescriptions/2009/11/lefties_against_reform.html. 
 34. Obama stressed that this was not a “federal takeover” as asserted by opponents, but 
rather a more robust federal regulatory scheme that would ensure a more functional private 
market. Rather than creating a centralized financing scheme like Social Security, the 
“mandate” was actually part of broader scheme to regulate private insurance companies to 
create meaningful choice for individuals shopping in the individual insurance market. 
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system of shared responsibility was necessary to ensure affordable access for 
everyone.35 
This dominant mandate narrative shaped the focus of legal challenges 
as well. The primary legal justification for enacting the coverage requirement 
asserted by Congress in the legislation and by the Obama Administration in 
court briefs was its power to regulate interstate commerce.36 The 
government made clear that this requirement was part of a broader 
regulatory scheme to regulate activity (the purchase and sale of insurance) 
because of its financial impact on the interstate market, and typically 
penalties used to enforce such regulatory mandates must be justified under 
the commerce power. 
The government’s characterization of the coverage requirement in its 
legal defense of the ACA was more nuanced. In legal briefs, the federal 
government argued that the coverage requirement alternatively could be 
upheld as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power,37 but this assertion did 
not take hold. For one thing, although the federal government was 
responsible for crafting the mandate frame, opponents clearly preferred it to 
the taxing choice alternative as a legal strategy. Opponents viewed a legal 
challenge to the commerce power as a promising opportunity in light of 
what some saw as a trend of narrowing federal power, especially by the 
Rehnquist Court, and predictions that such narrowing would continue under 
the Roberts Court.38 Opponents had good reason to be optimistic about 
using the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the commerce power, as opposed 
to the much broader tax and spend power, which was seen as incredibly 
easy to satisfy and not subject to the same kind of Tenth Amendment 
constraints.39 Moreover, because the mandate was characterized as 
 
 35. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Remarks on the United States Supreme Court Ruling on 
the Affordable Care Act (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/w 
s/?pid=101087; Barack Obama, Remarks at a Campaign Rally in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
(July 6, 2012), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101330; 
Future of Health Care Reform, CBS NEWS (July 15, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/ 
watch/?id=5162895n. 
 36. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2011). 
 37. Reply Brief for Petitioner (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 21-25, Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 748426. 
 38. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 89 
(2001); Adam Winkler, Can They Kill Health Care in Court?, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/03/23/how-to-kill-health-care-in-court.html. 
 39. This concern has commonly been raised in the context of criticism that the Court has 
not robustly applied Tenth Amendment limits on the federal government’s ability to establish 
conditions on its spending power, at least until the Court’s Medicaid coercion holding in NFIB. 
See Clark, supra note 5, at pt. II.B. But this concern has also been implicit in early debates 
about the mandate in which challengers denied the viability of a taxing power claim, but 
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“essential” to the other reforms in the ACA as part of the government’s 
commerce argument, opponents believed that striking down the mandate 
could be used to kill the entire Act or at least the private insurance 
expansion.40 
The commerce clause question quickly became the focal point for legal 
scholars as well. Congress’ use of the commerce power to mandate citizens 
to purchase a private good was viewed as “unprecedented” and as 
presenting a novel and weighty constitutional question with significant 
implications for the scope of the federal government’s power in other areas. 
A split emerged among commentators and legal scholars41 on the 
constitutionality of the mandate under the commerce power, generating 
further controversy and leading to predictions that this would be the 
determinative legal issue. 
The trend among lower courts affirmed this focus: a split emerged on 
the commerce clause issue,42 while the government’s taxing power claim 
was universally viewed as a much weaker one. In fact, no lower court 
upheld the mandate as an exercise of the taxing power.43 Lower courts that 
addressed and rejected the taxing power justification seemed to view the 
commerce and taxing theories as reflecting dichotomous conceptions of the 
ACA’s coverage requirement: either the shared responsibility payment was a 
“tax” that would be considered under the taxing power or it was a “penalty” 
used to enforce a mandate that must be justified under the commerce 
 
noted that even if it is used, it should be subject to the same Tenth Amendment limits enforced 
on the commerce clause. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 40. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591-93. 
 41. See Mark Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1825, 1827-29 (2011); see also Kevin Sack, Florida Suit Poses a Challenge to Health 
Care Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/health/policy/ 
11lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all. 
 42. Compare Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding the mandate under the commerce power), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566, with Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
648 F.3d 1235, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the individual mandate exceeded 
Congress’ commerce power), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. 
Ct. 2566. 
 43. See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 5-10 (D.C. Cir. 2011), abrogated by 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.,132 S. Ct. 2566 (applying a functional analysis to reject the “tax” 
label for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act bar and only considering the constitutionality of 
the mandate under the commerce power); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 
539-40, 549 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(rejecting the “tax” label for purposes of the AIA bar and noting that there is no reason to 
consider the taxing power justification for the mandate because it is a constitutional exercise of 
the commerce power). In concurring opinions, Judges Sutton and Graham specifically 
considered and rejected the taxing power theory as justification for the mandate. Thomas 
More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d. at 550-54, 566. 
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power.44 Only one court explicitly left open the possibility that the taxing 
power argument was a viable one, but it did not consider the issue.45 
One reason commonly given by courts for rejecting the taxing argument 
was the government’s own framing of the coverage requirement as a 
mandate enforced by a penalty. This was true, despite the fact that every 
lower court considering the issue acknowledged that labels do not 
necessarily control the constitutional question of whether something is a tax 
or a penalty, and that courts should make an independent judgment to 
determine whether a particular exaction functions more like a tax or penalty. 
Lower courts seemed quite concerned about the fact that the ACA’s statutory 
language and political framing sent a clear and consistent message that the 
failure to buy insurance was unlawful and would be penalized, and so the 
dominant framing clearly impacted lower courts’ attempts to look beyond 
statutory labels.46 The trend among lower courts seemed to foreclose serious 
consideration of the government’s attempt to provide an alternative 
 
 44. See Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Beginning with the district court in this case, all have found, 
without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a regulatory penalty, not a tax.”). 
 45. The Fourth Circuit was the only court to find that the assessment could be 
characterized as a tax, but this was for a different legal question: whether the challenge to the 
coverage requirement was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA). See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. 
Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 397-401 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (vacating the judgment of the district court because it lacked jurisdiction to 
decide the constitutionality of the act based on the AIA). The AIA bars suits seeking to restrain 
the assessment or collection of a tax; taxpayers must first pay the assessment before they can 
bring a suit to challenge its lawfulness. Determining whether an assessment qualifies as a “tax” 
for purposes of the AIA bar is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is different from the 
kind of functional analysis that courts use to determine whether or not a particular assessment 
should be classified as a tax for constitutional purposes. The constitutional analysis is 
discussed in greater detail in Parts III.C. and IV of this article. For a more in-depth 
consideration of the difference between the AIA and the constitutional question, see Clark, 
supra note 5, at pt. III.B. 
 46. See, e.g. Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 
F.3d at 1314 (“It is not surprising to us that all of the federal courts which have otherwise 
reached sharply divergent conclusions on the constitutionality of the individual mandate, have 
spoken with clarion uniformity [on the taxing power issue]”). The Eleventh Circuit goes on to 
explain the relevance of the statutory label: “The plain language of the statute and well-settled 
principles of statutory construction overwhelmingly establish that the individual mandate is not 
a tax, but rather a penalty. The legislative history of the Act further supports this conclusion.” 
Id. In responding to the government’s claims that the court should look beyond the label to 
consider how the assessment operates in practice, the court explained why it came to the 
same conclusion: “Even ignoring Congress’s deliberate choice of the term ‘penalty,’ the 
individual mandate on its face imposes a monetary sanction on an individual who ‘fails to 
meet the requirement’ to maintain ‘minimum essential coverage.’ As we see it, such an 
exaction appears in every important respect to be ‘punishment for an unlawful act or 
omission,’ which defines the very ‘concept of penalty.’” Id. at 1319 (citations omitted). 
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justification based on the framing of the coverage requirement as a tax on 
choice. 
III.  THE COUNTER NARRATIVE: TAXING “CHOICE” 
On the surface, the dominant narrative seemed to assume that the tax 
and commerce power theories presented competing and inconsistent 
conceptions of the coverage provision, and that the mandate/penalty frame 
was the correct one. A counter narrative was developing, however, that 
showed the coverage provision could not be so easily classified. 
A. Policy Critique and the Reality of Choice 
Many people desirous of reform were not satisfied with the compromise 
in the ACA in light of the Administration’s purported goal of achieving 
universal coverage. Critics attacked President Obama for never considering 
the only option that would truly guarantee universal coverage –– a 
Medicare-for-all type of system in which participation was truly compulsory 
and healthcare financing was centralized.47 By contrast, the ACA preserves a 
market-based system in which affordability, and thus access to insurance, 
depends on a number of variables, including insurance company 
participation, rate regulation, and individuals’ ability and willingness to 
become health insurance consumers in this new system. Those familiar with 
the problems of a fragmented healthcare market and the prior dysfunction 
of the individual insurance market were skeptical about whether the 
insurance reforms in the ACA would go far enough to realize its coverage 
goals, and lack of adequate consumer participation was a serious 
concern.48 
The government’s own Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated 
that some people subject to the “mandate” would choose to pay the 
assessment instead –– enough to yield approximately $4 million in revenue. 
These estimates were consistent with assertions that the amount of the 
 
 47. See, e.g., J.D. Kleinke, The Conservative Case for Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 29, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/opinion/sunday/why-obamacare-
is-a-conservativesdream.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing liberals’ disappointment 
that Obama did not propose a single-payer plan, like Medicare-for-All, or include a public 
option). 
 48. Id.; see also Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in 
Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 266, 
266 (2011); Alison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented 
Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 56 (2010) (describing the problems with 
building reform on fragmented healthcare markets). I count myself among those supportive of 
the ACA’s goal to expand coverage, but optimistically critical or cautiously optimistic about its 
success, particularly because I believe that consumer participation is so essential and yet has 
received remarkably little attention until relatively recently. 
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“penalty” was too low to exert the kind of financial pressure that would 
coerce people into purchasing insurance and that, as a result, people would 
have a meaningful choice to not buy insurance. Setting such a low penalty 
may seem confusing in light of Obama’s rhetorical stance about the need 
for a mandate, but it is consistent with his original discomfort with a coercive 
approach to reform –– recall that campaign-Obama believed such coercion 
was unnecessary because of his confidence that people would make the 
“right” choice.49 
One reason the Administration’s enforcement approach was vulnerable 
to criticism was because of a lack of discussion about the assumptions 
underlying consumer participation as an essential piece of health reform. 
Questions such as how people make these kinds of decisions, what tools 
are most effective for influencing these decisions, and why or how much 
influence the federal government expected the penalty to have on these 
decisions were never answered.50 President Obama seemed to go back and 
forth between believing a mandate was unnecessary and necessary, without 
articulating the behavioral assumptions underlying his conclusions or the 
government’s use of a penalty and the amount chosen. Although this 
creates uncertainty about consumer participation in the new market and the 
accuracy of CBO predictions, the fact that some people will exercise the 
choice not to buy insurance under the ACA seems uncontroversial. 
B. Competing Legal Theories: Tax on Choice or Mandate with Penalty? 
In addition to raising questions about the potential effectiveness of 
health reform, the choice narrative was more consistent with the taxing 
power justification that was not viewed as viable by courts and which did not 
receive its due attention by the legal academy. Some scholars did recognize 
this, asserting early on that the taxing power was the better justification for 
the ACA because it was a more accurate interpretation of the ACA’s legal 
design.51 Jack Balkin provided one of the earliest defenses of the law on 
 
 49. See Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate: Why do politicians reverse their positions?, THE 
NEW YORKER (Jun. 25, 2012), available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/06/25/ 
120625fa_fact_klein. 
 50. Joshua Guetzkow, Beyond Deservingness: Congressional Discourse on Poverty, 1964-
1996, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 173, 176 (2010) (“In crafting legislative 
solutions, policymakers employ not only diagnostic frames but also their notions about how to 
bring about a desired behavior in the target population. To gain a better understanding of 
policy development and choice, we therefore also need to understand the ways that 
policymakers frame targets of policy and how this interacts with their [diagnostic framing of the 
problem].”). 
 51. This section focuses on arguments developed by Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, and Robert 
Cooter with Neil Siegel. But other scholars argued that the taxing power provided an 
alternative justification for the coverage requirement as well. See, e.g., Brian D. Galle, 
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taxing power grounds in a 2009 on-line debate about the constitutionality 
of the mandate with attorneys David Rivkin and Lee Casey who opposed 
reform.52 The debate was held after different versions of the ACA had 
passed in the House and Senate, and before the language was finalized in 
the reconciled version. Balkin began by asserting the taxing justification, 
noting that the assessment was part of a broader framework that used 
exactions and tax subsidies and credits to encourage the purchase of 
insurance, as well as to raise revenue.53 Although Balkin began with the 
taxing justification, the debate’s focus eventually turned to the commerce 
clause because this is where his opponents focused their arguments.54 
Rivkin and Casey initially did not address the taxing power justification 
on its own merits; they relied heavily on the “mandate” label used in the 
Senate version (as opposed to what they said “purports to be a tax 
mechanism” in the House version), and they believed a mandate could only 
be justified under the commerce power.55 In response to Balkin’s taxing 
argument, however, they argued that even if the taxing power was a viable 
alternative justification, it would nonetheless be subject to the same 
constitutional limits as the commerce clause.56 In this way, Rivkin and Casey 
essentially collapsed the taxing and commerce clause analyses, despite 
contrary precedent that made clear that the taxing power is much broader 
than the commerce power and not subject to the same kind of Tenth 
Amendment limits. Rivkin and Casey also seemed to place greater 
significance on the label than Balkin: Rivkin and Casey found the 
elimination of the “tax” label from prior bills significant in deciding to treat 
 
Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27, 28 
(2010). 
 52. See A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 93, 94 (2009) [hereinafter A Healthy Debate] (debate between David B. Rivkin, Jr. and 
Lee A. Casey challenging the mandate, and Jack M. Balkin defending it). 
 53. Id. at 102. 
 54. Id. at 105 (“The arguments for Congress’s power to pass health insurance reform 
under the General Welfare Clause are conclusive. However, because Rivkin and Casey devote 
most of their discussion to the commerce power, I will discuss these issues as well.”). 
 55. Id. at 94-101, 109. 
 56. Id. at 100-01 (criticizing the view of the taxing power as a broader justification of the 
“mandate” than the commerce power as an “inability to comprehend that the Constitution 
inherently limits the reach of the Taxing and Spending Clause, just as it does the Commerce 
Clause, and that exertions of congressional power that exceed the proper scope of these 
clauses are void”). According to Rivkin and Casey, it does not matter if the “tax” used to 
enforce the mandate would otherwise be a constitutional exercise of the taxing power; the fact 
that the mandate exceeds the commerce clause means both are void. Id. at 100-01. They did 
not seem to seriously consider the taxing justification on its own merits until their rebuttal of 
Balkin, but then argued that as a tax, it would violate the Constitution’s prohibition on direct 
taxes. Id. at 110. 
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the challenged provision as a mandate that had to be justified under the 
commerce power, while Balkin asserted that the coverage requirement could 
be justified under both the commerce power and taxing power.57 
Balkin affirmed this position in a 2010 article even after it was clear that 
the ACA’s statutory language and political rhetoric adopted a 
“mandate/penalty” framework.58 Although the primary goal of the article 
was apparently to weigh in on what was already shaping up to be the 
dominant narrative –– whether the mandate could be justified under the 
commerce power –– Balkin could not ignore what seemed a more 
compelling justification, noting briefly that the challenged provision is likely 
“fully constitutional” under Congress’s taxing power because it is a tax that 
“clearly promotes the general welfare under existing precedents.”59 He went 
on to explain why he thought the taxing characterization was more 
appropriate: 
The [ACA] features an “individual mandate” that is designed to coax 
uninsured persons into purchasing health insurance. The term . . . is 
misleading for two reasons. First, the law does not actually require all 
individuals to purchase insurance . . . . Second, it is not actually a mandate. 
It is a tax, which people do not have to pay if they have purchased health 
insurance . . . . The tax gives uninsured people a choice.60 
Akhil Amar also provided a particularly robust analysis in favor of the 
taxing power, by looking beyond the statutory label and focusing on the way 
the exaction would function in practice.61 Like Balkin, Amar emphasized that 
the ACA gives people a legally equivalent choice between two options –– 
purchasing insurance and making the shared responsibility payment –– 
which undermines the idea that the government is using the law to force 
people to buy insurance.62 Amar acknowledged the ACA’s “regulatory” goal 
to encourage the purchase of insurance, but explained that precedent 
makes clear that taxes can serve a regulatory purpose as long as raising 
revenue is also a goal.63 
The problem with Balkin and Amar’s approaches, however, is that they 
did not engage the obvious tension in the framing of the commerce and 
 
 57. A Healthy Debate, supra note 52, at 102-08. 
 58. See Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 45 (2010). 
 59. Id. at 45. 
 60. Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added). 
 61. Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform, YALE L.J. ONLINE 5-7, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856506. In fact, Amar has accused opponents of reform as the 
ones playing word games by attributing greater meaning to use of labels than warranted. 
Amar says this argument defies constitutional text, constitutional history, Supreme Court 
precedent, and longstanding canons of interpretation. Id. at 8-12. 
 62. Id. at 5-12. 
 63. Id. at 13. 
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taxing power arguments. They seemed to treat the taxing and commerce 
theories as equally plausible for constitutional purposes without expressly 
addressing the idea that the compulsory nature of the action (buying) that 
must be justified under the commerce clause would seem to foreclose a tax-
based theory that presumes that people are not coerced into action because 
they have a genuine choice. This tension is implicitly suggested at different 
points in their discussions. For example, Amar called the payment alternative 
to the coverage requirement a “tax-penalty” a few times.64 He also said that 
even if it does not qualify as a tax under a strict definition it should be 
understood as a “tax-equivalent.”65 Similarly, Balkin used the terms 
interchangeably in ways that suggest the provision defies easy classification: 
It is likely that the individual mandate is fully constitutional under Congress’ 
power under the General Welfare Clause and the power “[t]o lay and 
collect Taxes . . . .” Nevertheless, the tax is also constitutional as an exercise 
of Congress’s commerce power.66 
C. The Hybrid Nature of the ACA’s Coverage Requirement: Reconciling Tax 
and Penalty Theories? 
One of the only articles that addressed this apparent tension in a robust 
way was written by Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel.67 Like Amar and Balkin, 
Cooter and Siegel believed that the coverage requirement could be found 
constitutional under either the commerce or taxing power theory.68 But in 
Not the Power to Destroy, Cooter and Siegel considered the tension 
presented by these alternative theories, and the implications for 
constitutional analysis. They explained that the ACA is a kind of hybrid 
exaction that defies easy classification, and that while such hybrids are not 
exceptional they do present a greater challenge to judges to justify the 
threshold classification that determines its constitutional treatment.69 
Based on a review of the Court’s dense and somewhat inconsistent 
precedent governing the tax-penalty distinction, Cooter and Siegel 
developed a theory to explain the constitutionally relevant differences 
between taxes and penalties which could be used to guide courts in 
 
 64. See, e.g., id. at 13 (“Apart from their Simon Says word game, Obamacare critics 
have also argued that the insurance mandate cannot be upheld as a tax because the mandate 
operate as an independent regulation from the tax-penalty.”). 
 65. Id. at 16-21. 
 66. Balkin, supra note 58, at 45 (emphasis added). 
 67. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of 
the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012). 
 68. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Taxes, Regulations, and Health Care: Part II of 
Collective Action Federalism 14-15 (Sep. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
University of Chicago Law School). 
 69. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1226-29, 1239-47. 
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classifying hybrid exactions like the ACA’s. First, they emphasized that the 
labeling is not and should not be determinative. Courts look beyond labels 
to determine the proper classification and thus which constitutional test to 
apply.70 In looking beyond the label, courts consider how a particular 
exaction or assessment functions –– that is, what effect it will have on an 
individual’s conduct.71 Penalties typically must be justified under a stronger 
constitutional standard (like the commerce power), in part, because 
penalties are coercive and prevent conduct; taxes, on the other hand, may 
dampen conduct, but government takes as a given that such conduct will 
continue so that taxing the behavior will generate some revenue. Thus 
penalties and taxes have distinct effects that matter for constitutional 
purposes. 
Next, Cooter and Siegel identified three salient characteristics relevant to 
courts’ classification of an exaction as either a tax or a penalty: whether the 
amount or magnitude of the exaction is significant enough to undermine 
choice or coerce someone into a decision; whether there is a mens rea 
requirement (reflecting intentionality); and whether there is an escalative or 
recidivist element to the exaction.72 They used these characteristics to 
develop an “effects test” to determine when exactions should be treated as a 
tax or penalty for constitutional purposes based on whether an exaction is 
likely to prevent conduct (like a penalty) or merely dampen conduct (like a 
tax). The easy cases –– that is cases in which something can be easily 
classified as a tax or penalty –– are where all three of these characteristics 
align: If none of the three are present, then it looks like a tax that merely 
dampens conduct and is likely satisfied under the very broad tax and spend 
power. If all three characteristics are present, then the exaction is likely to 
prevent conduct, and thus should be treated like a penalty, which means it 
will have to be justified under some other regulatory power, like the 
commerce power. 73 
Finally, Cooter and Siegel apply this test to the ACA coverage 
requirement, acknowledging the challenge it presents as a “hybrid exaction” 
with both tax and penalty characteristics. They note that the statutory 
language in the ACA, which suggests that participation is mandatory and 
that the failure to buy insurance is unlawful and will be penalized, creates 
“expressive characteristics” that make the law look like a mandate enforced 
by a penalty.74 But in applying the above three-pronged effects test, they 
 
 70. Id. at 1200-10. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1210-22. 
 73. Id. at 1222-35. 
 74. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1239-41 (emphasis added) (acknowledging that 
Congress’ choice of label was “not arbitrary, thoughtless, or expressively interchangeable [but 
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ultimately concluded that the “material effects” of the law will likely make it 
function more like a tax: the magnitude of the exaction is too small to have 
a coercive effect on people (based on CBO estimates); there is no scienter 
requirement of the kind that suggests bad intent; and the amount of the 
“penalty” does not increase with repeated failures to buy insurance.75 In 
short, according to Cooter and Siegel, because one would not expect the 
ACA to have the kind of punitive or coercive effect that one expects from 
criminal or serious civil penalties, it should be treated like a tax for 
constitutional purposes. Without much discussion, Cooter and Siegel 
assume that the tax-like “material” effects will trump any penalty-like 
“expressive” effects;76 that is, at most the law will have a dampening effect 
by encouraging some people to buy insurance, but it will not compel 
anyone to buy insurance.77 
Against an overwhelming policy and legal narrative that focused on the 
mandate and commerce power, Amar, Balkin, and Cooter and Siegel’s 
attempts to refocus our attention on the taxing choice argument were 
ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court’s decision. It is not clear why this 
“taxing choice” argument or the tension between the taxing choice and 
mandate with penalty narratives did not get more attention prior to NFIB. 
One reason could be that, as noted above, proponents and opponents 
were effective at focusing everyone’s attention on the mandate in their 
messaging. A government mandate creates a clear, and thus more 
powerful, image of the challenged action, making it easier to stoke the fears 
that animated mainstream discussion and fed into more sensational claims 
of an unprecedented example of federal intrusion into personal 
decisionmaking. 
The taxing choice theory, on the other hand, is based on a more 
nuanced consideration of the effect of the law, which, in turn, is based on 
uncertain and complex behavioral predictions about how many people 
would in fact choose to buy insurance and why. Although policy and legal 
critiques consistently cite CBO estimates of people who would pay the 
assessment to challenge the mandate rhetoric, this has not been very 
successful as a descriptive tool. The reality of whether one will even be 
 
rather] appears to reflect a congressional judgment that failing to insure is wrong. . . . [Thus] 
[t]he minimum coverage provisions expresses a penalty”). 
 75. Id. at 1241-47. 
 76. See id. at 1247; see infra Parts III.B., IV.A. for a more in-depth discussion of Cooter 
and Siegel’s assumptions underlying this conclusion. 
 77. As explored further in Part IV, infra, Cooter and Siegel’s article acknowledges the fact 
that the expressive characteristics of the law that make it look like a penalty may have some 
effect of their own, however the authors seem to easily dismiss its significance, concluding that 
the material effects (suggesting a tax) trump any possible coercive or punitive effects of these 
expressive characteristics. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1247. 
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subject to the mandate, whether one will be eligible for a subsidy and how 
much, and what insurance will cost is based on technical, detailed, and 
complex rules and calculations which cannot be performed yet because they 
depend on other variables (such as insurance premiums and future income) 
that may be unknown. Prior to the NFIB decision, as the law’s fate hung in 
the balance, many were simply waiting to see if the law would survive before 
investing the time to understand the details of implementation. 
Finally, the taxing argument may also have not received as much 
attention because far fewer legal scholars seemed willing to navigate the 
confusing precedent on the tax-penalty distinction or the additional, and 
relatively obscure, constitutional question raised by the taxing power –– 
whether the ACA would violate the prohibition on direct taxes.78 The result 
was that the taxing choice narrative did not receive the kind of airing it 
deserved as a constitutional or policy matter. 
IV.  NFIB 
Because of the dominant narrative described in Part II, many people 
were caught by surprise when the Roberts Court in NFIB upheld the 
mandate as an exercise of the taxing power, but not the commerce power.79 
The taxing choice narrative was vindicated, but the Court’s reasoning 
sparked criticism from both sides of the debate. Although the decision 
brought closure with respect to the constitutional challenge, its reasoning 
underscored the tension between the taxing choice and mandate narratives, 
as well as the practical uncertainty created in the ACA with respect to the 
role of consumer choice in the newly regulated private markets. 
 
 78. At various debates or panel discussions I observed or helped moderate, there were a 
number of constitutional law scholars who said they did not feel as comfortable addressing the 
taxing power questions so the commerce clause became the focus by default. Even the 
majority in NFIB was criticized by the dissent for not giving this question adequate attention: 
“[W]e must observe that rewriting § 5000A as a tax . . . would force us to confront a difficult 
constitutional question: whether this is a direct tax that must be apportioned among the States 
according to their population . . . . [T]he meaning of the Direct Tax Clause is famously 
unclear, and its application here is a question of first impression that deserves more thoughtful 
consideration than the lick-and-a-promise accorded by the Government and its supporters. 
The Government’s opening brief did not even address the question . . . . And once 
respondents raised the issue, the Government devoted a mere 21 lines of its reply brief to the 
issue. At oral argument, the most prolonged statement about the issue was just over 50 
words.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655. 
 79. See Barnett, supra note 14; Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Masha, Constitutional 
Uncertainty and the Design of Social Insurance: Reflections on the ACA Case 1 (Columbia Law 
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-316, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/absstract=2146814. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
288 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:267 
A. The Holding 
With respect to the constitutionality of the individual coverage 
requirement, the Court granted certiorari on the question of whether it could 
be justified by Congress’ commerce or taxing power.80 Consistent with the 
dominant focus pre-NFIB, most of the Court’s focus was on the commerce 
clause issue. Writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts considered this 
argument first, holding that the coverage requirement exceeded the 
commerce clause.81 Central to his analysis was the conception of the 
mandate as compelling the purchase of insurance. He held that while the 
regulation of the insurance market is undeniably authorized under the 
commerce power, this power cannot be used to compel one to enter the 
market or to create commerce where none existed before.82 Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito in a joint dissent,83 and Thomas in a separate 
dissent,84 agreed with Roberts’ conclusion, echoing his concerns about an 
expansive commerce power used to compel individuals to purchase private 
goods. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
dissented from this part of the opinion; they believed it was constitutional 
under the commerce power relying heavily on the government’s 
characterization of the mandate as an essential part of the broader 
regulatory scheme to fix the insurance market and solve the uninsurance 
problem.85 All of the Justices, through four separate opinions, seemed to 
embrace the framing of the challenged provision as a mandate, enforced by 
a penalty; they simply differed as to whether or not it could be justified under 
the commerce power. 
Roberts then turned to the federal government’s alternative justification 
under the taxing power.86 In a move which seemed to catch even his 
colleagues by surprise,87 Roberts, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, upheld the “mandate” on this basis.88 There were three notable 
aspects of this part of Roberts’ opinion. First, Roberts, writing for himself 
again, began by admitting that the government’s taxing power argument 
presented a serious conceptual challenge to the Court: 
 
 80. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577. 
 81. Id. at 2585-87 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 82. Id. at 2585-93 (focusing on the activity-inactivity distinction). 
 83. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 84. Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 85. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2619-23. 
 86. Id. at 2595. The Constitution provides that Congress may “lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 87. See Paul Campos, Roberts Wrote Both Obamacare Opinions, SALON.COM (July 3, 
2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/07/03/roberts_wrote_both_obamacare_opinions/. 
 88. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-94. 
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The Government’s tax power argument asks us to view that statute 
differently than we did in considering its commerce power theory. In making 
its Commerce Clause argument, the Government defended the mandate as 
a regulation requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. The 
Government does not claim that the taxing power allows Congress to issue 
such a command. Instead, the Government asks us to read the mandate not 
as ordering individuals to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on 
those who do not buy that product.89 
Roberts’s unease with this alternative conception was palpable, as he 
immediately conceded that the mandate/penalty conception was “the most 
straightforward reading of the statute.”90 
Although Roberts acknowledged the tension between these conceptions, 
he did not try to explain which conception was the right or better one as a 
constitutional matter. Roberts simply noted that statutes can have different 
meanings and relied on a canon of interpretation that courts have a duty to 
read a statute in the light that avoids it being found unconstitutional. As long 
as the government’s alternative reading of the statute is a reasonable one, 
the Court said, it has a “plain duty . . . to adopt [this reading if it] will save 
the Act.”91 This meant that in order to answer the constitutional question 
before it, the Supreme Court had to assess the reasonableness of the 
government’s legal assertion that the shared responsibility payment could be 
considered a tax, as opposed to a penalty.92 
In considering whether the “tax” interpretation was reasonable, Roberts, 
this time writing for the majority, refused to defer to Congress’ label.93 The 
Court said that it must look beyond the label, and it applied a test similar to 
the tests used by Amar, Balkin, and Cooter and Siegel, to determine whether 
the payment effectively functioned more like a tax or a penalty.94 Under this 
 
 89. Id. at 2593. 
 90. Id. (noting the use of the word “shall” in I.R.C. §5000A(a) (2011)). 
 91. Id. at 2593-94 (“The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of 
the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”). 
 92. This tax-penalty question was complicated by another claim asserted by the federal 
government early in the litigation: that the legal challenge to the mandate was premature 
under the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA). The AIA provides that “no suit for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any 
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” I.R.C. 
§7421(a) (2011). This means that individuals must pay their taxes before they can bring a suit 
to challenge them, so the earliest that a taxpayer who failed to get insurance would have to 
pay the “shared responsibility payment” is 2015. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court 
unanimously held that the assessment was not a tax for purposes of the AIA bar, even though 
a majority found that it could be justified as a constitutional tax. For a more in-depth 
comparison of these two claims, see Clark, supra note 5, pt. III.B. 
 93. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (majority opinion). 
 94. Id. 
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functional test, the Court held that the payment looked like a tax in many 
respects: 
It is paid into the Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns; it 
does not apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes because 
their household income is less than the filing threshold in the Internal 
Revenue Code; and for taxpayers who do owe the payment, its amount is 
determined by such familiar factors as taxable income, number of 
dependents, and joint filing status. Moreover, the requirement to pay is 
found in the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by the IRS, which must 
assess and collect it “in the same manner as taxes.” Finally, this process 
yields the “essential feature of any tax” by producing at least some revenue 
for the Government.” Indeed, the payment is expected to raise about $4 
billion per year by 2017.95 
Moreover, the Court found that the assessment does not have the usual 
indices of a penalty for unlawful conduct. In distinguishing the ACA payment 
from the kind of penalty typically subject to the stricter commerce clause test, 
the Court looked at three things: the amount due, the absence of a scienter 
requirement, and the means of enforcement. First, the Court found that 
because for most Americans the amount due will be far less than the price 
of insurance, this gives consumers a real choice between making the 
payment to the government or buying insurance; the payment does not look 
like a “prohibitory financial punishment” that is designed to force 
compliance with the mandate.96 Second, the means of enforcement is solely 
through collection by the IRS, and the ACA even prohibits the IRS from using 
its harshest collection tools, such as liens, levies, and criminal prosecution. 
Finally, the fact that there is no scienter requirement, coupled with the 
government’s assurance that people who pay the tax are viewed as 
complying with the law, suggests that the government is not really penalizing 
uninsurance as wrongful behavior;97 rather it is using the shared 
responsibility payment simply to encourage people to purchase insurance. 
Roberts said that the tax on the failure to buy insurance is similar to other 
regulatory measures upheld as taxes, such as taxes on cigarettes and 
sawed-off shotguns.98 In acknowledging this regulatory goal, Roberts says 
that this regulatory character does not undermine the government’s taxing 
power argument.99 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2595-96. 
 97. Id. 
 98. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 99. Id. (“Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an 
economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed . . . . That 
§5000A seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean that it 
cannot be a valid exercise of the taxing power.”). 
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Once Roberts determined that the taxing choice interpretation was 
reasonable, it was easy to find the provision constitutional under the very 
broad taxing power which simply requires that the tax raises revenue related 
to the general welfare. The Court considered and rejected arguments that it 
violated other Constitutional provisions, such as the Article I prohibition on 
direct taxes.100 
B. The Dissent 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito wrote a joint dissent that 
was critical of this holding and particularly scathing about the Court’s 
willingness to take the taxing power argument seriously. In fact, in framing 
the overall case, they identify two questions that make the case difficult: the 
first having to do with the constitutionality of the mandate under the 
commerce power, and the second with whether the Medicaid expansion is 
structured coercively in violation of the tax and spend power.101 They 
ignored the taxing power justification altogether –– at least in this initial 
framing –– suggesting that they did not even view it as a credible claim. 
Indeed, after analyzing, and rejecting, the commerce power justification of 
the mandate, the dissenting justices would have stopped there.102 
The dissenting Justices then criticized the threshold assumption 
underlying the government’s and majority’s suggestions that the payment 
can be legitimately conceived as a penalty and tax at the same time, for 
purposes of applying two different constitutional standards: 
The Government contends, however, as expressed in the caption to Part II of 
its brief, that “THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS INDEPENDENTLY 
AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS’S TAXING POWER.” The phrase 
“independently authorized” suggests the existence of a creature never 
hitherto seen in the United States Reports: A penalty for constitutional 
purposes that is also a tax for constitutional purposes. In all our cases the 
two are mutually exclusive. The provision challenged under the Constitution 
is either a penalty or else a tax. Of course in many cases what was a 
regulatory mandate enforced by a penalty could have been imposed as a 
tax upon permissible action; or what was imposed as a tax upon permissible 
action could have been a regulatory mandate enforced by a penalty. But we 
 
 100. Id. at 2598-2600 (holding that the payment did not violate the prohibition on direct 
taxes in art. I, § 9, cl. 4 of the U. S. Constitution and was not subject to the same “activity 
requirement” as the commerce power). 
 101. Id. at 2642-43 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 2650. 
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know of no case, and the Government cites none, in which the imposition 
was, for constitutional purposes, both. The two are mutually exclusive.103 
The joint dissenters insisted that precedent “establish[es] a clear line 
between a tax and a penalty” where a tax is “an enforced contribution to 
provide for the support of government” and a penalty is “an exaction 
imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.”104 They then argued 
that the threshold question of whether the provision is a tax or penalty 
should turn on the Government’s framing, and it was clear that the Act 
adopted a framing of “wrongdoing” through its use of terms like “shall,” 
“requirement,” and “penalty.”105 They also noted the President’s repeated 
insistence to the public that the shared responsibility payment was a penalty, 
and not a tax. The joint dissenters ultimately concluded that “there is simply 
no way, ‘without doing violence to the fair meaning of the words used,’ to 
escape what Congress enacted: a mandate that individuals maintain 
minimum essential coverage, enforced by a penalty.”106 
Although they clearly lost this legal argument, as the taxing power was 
used to uphold reform, their view of the correct framing of the provision 
seemed to prevail as the mandate/penalty narrative was the one that 
seemed to resonate with the entire Court. Despite upholding the “mandate” 
under the taxing power, the reasoning throughout the opinion reinforced the 
notion that these were conflicting and incompatible narratives. This left 
many unsatisfied with and confused by the majority opinion.107 Even those 
who agreed with the conclusion lamented what seemed to be a lackluster 
explanation for its holding.108 Indeed, Roberts’ reluctant and apologetic 
 
 103. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The dissent 
admits that it can be “both [a tax and penalty] for statutory purposes since Congress can 
define ‘tax’ and ‘penalty’ in its enactments any way it wishes.” Id. at 2651 n.5. 
 104. Id. at 2651(citing U.S. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 
224 (1996)). The dissent notes that “[i]n a few cases, this Court has held that a ‘tax’ imposed 
upon private conduct was so onerous as to be in effect a penalty. But we have never held – 
never – that a penalty imposed for violation of the law was so trivial as to be in effect a tax. 
We have never held that any exaction imposed for violation of the law is an exercise of 
Congress’ taxing power-even when the statute calls it a tax, much less when (as here) the 
statute repeatedly calls it a penalty.” Id. 
 105. Id. at 2651-52. 
 106. Id. at 2651. The dissent relied on a different canon of statutory instruction to 
challenge the majority’s willingness to view this as a tax: “[T]hat a statute that penalizes an act 
makes it unlawful” Id. at 2652 (citing Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox R. Co., 24 
How. 247, 252 (1861)). The dissent also complained that “to say that the Individual Mandate 
merely imposes a tax is not to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655. 
 107. See Clark, supra note 5, at pt. V.A.2 (describing criticism of the Court’s decision). 
 108. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A Bigger Victory Than We Knew, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 
16, 2012 at 6, 12, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/aug/16/ 
bigger-victory-we-knew/. 
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tone, as well as Ginsburg’s neglect of the issue in her partial concurrence, 
suggests that not even a majority of the Court was fully persuaded by this 
justification.109 
The joint dissenters highlighted the majority’s failure to address the 
conceptual disconnect between the commerce power and the taxing power 
justifications,110 but the dissenting opinion was not very helpful for resolving 
this tension either. For the dissent, this mandate-penalty frame negated all 
other “functional” arguments used by the majority to conclude that the 
taxing argument was a reasonable interpretation for constitutional purposes, 
but the joint dissenters never explained why this was so. They merely 
criticized the countervailing taxing theory as a “self-serving litigating 
position[] entitled to no weight” in the face of a contradictory framing 
created by the statutory language.111 But in light of a long history of the 
Court prioritizing substance over form, the joint dissenters shirked their 
obligation to explain why the mandate frame should trump the choice 
architecture of the ACA. Neither the majority nor the dissent offered a 
coherent theory for classifying hybrid exactions like the ACA’s coverage 
requirement in a way that is consistent with the underlying concerns that 
lead us to treat penalties and taxes differently for constitutional purposes. 
C. Struggling to Reconcile Legal Choice with an Expressive Mandate 
Cooter and Siegel’s theory begins to fill in this gap, helping to illuminate 
the reason the Court struggles with these competing conceptions, and 
 
 109. Id.; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 110. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609-29 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing the mandate’s 
constitutionality under the commerce clause only). 
 111. Id. at 2650-55. The dissenting Justices focused on what they considered potential 
harms of the majority’s decision. First, they said that rewriting the statute to interpret the 
provision as a tax lets the government avoid the political accountability for creating a tax. It is 
not clear how this could be in this case since rules governing the origination of taxes in the 
legislature do not seem to have been violated. Moreover, the idea that a mandate/penalty 
frame would avoid the backlash that a taxing scheme or that the “play or pay” rhetoric would 
have generated is not borne out by the controversy surrounding the mandate. See supra Part I. 
The dissent also criticized the majority’s holding for letting the government elide the negative 
constitutional implications that result from the most obvious constitutional question arising out 
of the government’s own choice to frame this as a mandate/penalty. NFIB, 132 S. Ct at 2655. 
But this simply begs the question about whether the provision was really a tax or penalty for 
constitutional purposes. Finally, the dissent was disturbed by the majority’s decision on the 
taxing power question in light of the Court’s unanimous holding that this was not a tax for AIA 
purposes. It held that the AIA was inapplicable to the challenge because in the statutory 
context, Congress’ choice to label the payment a “penalty” controls. The Court rejected the 
“functional test” that was used for the constitutional analysis, leaving open the possibility that 
the assessment could be viewed as a penalty for one purposes (the AIA statutory bar) and a 
tax for another (the constitutional analysis). Id. at 2583 (citations omitted). 
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offering a more robust justification for the majority’s conclusion. The Court’s 
functionality analysis is very similar to Cooter and Siegel’s effects test. Both 
focus primarily on the economic incentives for determining the likely “effect” 
of the law on consumer behavior.112 Moreover, the “straightforward 
reading” of the mandate referred to by the NFIB Court echoes what Cooter 
and Siegel describe as the law’s “expressive” characteristic. Although Cooter 
and Siegel do a better job of engaging the hybrid nature of the ACA and 
the tension between legal choice and an expressive mandate, they do not 
provide much discussion about the potential effects of these expressive 
characteristics or about how to account for these effects in classifying an 
exaction for constitutional law purposes. 
Cooter and Siegel do touch on this briefly. Specifically, they address the 
concern that these expressive characteristics will create penalty-like effects 
that could make people feel compelled to buy insurance. These concerns 
were raised by a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Seven-Sky v. 
Holder, one of the many cases challenging the constitutionality of the 
coverage requirement prior to NFIB.113 In Seven-Sky,114 the court addressed 
two issues relating to the characterization of the coverage requirement. The 
one receiving the most attention was whether the provision was 
constitutional under the commerce power; the court affirmed the district 
court’s holding that it was a constitutional exercise of Congress’ commerce 
power.115 
The court also decided that it needed to address a threshold 
jurisdictional question raised in an amicus brief about whether the challenge 
was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA). This question had important 
implications for whether the provision could be properly framed as a tax. 
The D.C. Circuit, like all other courts deciding this issue except one, held 
that the AIA did not apply because Congress deliberately chose to label the 
shared responsibility payment a penalty, and not a tax, and Congress did 
 
 112. Cooter and Siegel actually developed and circulated this theory in draft prior to the 
Court’s decision, however, the article was not formally completed and published until after 
decision. There is some speculation about whether the Court was informed by their work, as 
well as by other scholars like Amar and Balkin. See, e.g., Neil Siegel and Robert Cooter, 
Online ACA Symposium – A Theory of the Tax Power That Justifies – and May Have Informed 
the Chief Justice’s Analysis, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 9, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/ 
07/online-aca-symposium-a-theory-of-the-tax-power-that-justifies-and-may-have-informed-
the-chief-justices-analysis-2/. 
 113. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1246-47. 
 114. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 115. Id. at 14-20. The coverage requirement was also challenged using the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, but this claim received almost no discussion. In a footnote, the court 
briefly noted that it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’ claim because they 
failed to allege facts showing a substantial burden on their religious exercise. Id. at 5n.4. 
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not include any language in the ACA expressing a contrary intent. Although 
the test for determining whether something is classified as a “tax” for 
purposes of the AIA is a matter of statutory interpretation, and thus is legally 
distinct from the constitutional question, Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent on this 
jurisdictional issue and his explanation for why it was premature to decide 
the merits of the case, are relevant to understanding the choice/mandate 
tension in the constitutional context. 
Kavanaugh made clear that the government’s label would not be 
determinative of the constitutional question; yet he did not dismiss the 
relevance or significance of such labeling.116 Kavanaugh also made several 
interesting analytical moves in his opinion that destabilized the notion that 
the coverage requirement could be easily classified as a tax or penalty, even 
under a functional analysis. The first interesting move he made was to use a 
hybrid label throughout his dissent, which he sets out right at the beginning: 
One provision of the [ACA] requires most Americans to maintain health 
insurance or else pay a tax penalty when they file their annual tax returns. 
That provision — commonly referred to as the individual mandate — is 
codified in the Tax Code and takes effect in 2014. The tax penalty for those 
without health insurance is capped at the average price of a health 
insurance plan. The tax penalty is the only sanction for failing to have health 
insurance. And the IRS — and only the IRS — may assess, collect, and 
enforce the tax penalty.”117 
The second interesting move was his criticism of the majority’s “heavy 
rhetorical reliance on the fact that Congress labeled the individual mandate 
provision as a ‘penalty’ and not a ‘tax.’”118 In explaining why courts should 
not rely so heavily on rhetorical labels, Kavanaugh describes Congress’ 
possible motivation for choosing a penalty label that suggests the label may 
indeed have an important behavioral effect that goes beyond mere rhetoric. 
Specifically, he notes that Congress may choose the label “penalty” instead 
of “tax” because the “penalty” label suggests violation of a legal rule, which 
government believes will have a more powerful effect in altering behavior 
that Congress wants to encourage or discourage.119 
In fact, Kavanaugh cites to government reports which reveal how the 
federal government has used this strategy in other contexts. For example, he 
cites to a 1999 report by the Department of the Treasury which says that 
 
 116. In my opinion, Cooter and Siegel read too much into Kavanaugh’s footnote by using 
it to characterize Kavanaugh’s position as “deem[ing] it constitutionally irrelevant that the ACA 
labeled the exaction for noninsurance a ‘penalty’ instead of a ‘tax.’” Cooter & Siegel, supra 
note 67, at 1244 (emphasis added). 
 117. Seven-Sky, 661 F. 3d at 21 (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. at 29. 
 119. Id. at 29-30. 
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“[p]enalties clearly signal that noncompliance is not acceptable behavior . . 
. . In establishing social norms and expectations, subjecting the 
noncompliant behavior to any penalty may be as important as the exact 
level of the penalty . . . .”120 He cites to another report as early as 1989 in 
which an Executive Task Force for the commissioner’s Penalty Study asserted 
that “[p]enalties as a consequence of violating a standard of behavior 
remind taxpayers of their duty” and that “[p]enalties are a tool for 
change.”121 If such assumptions are true, then labeling would seem to be 
relevant to any constitutional test that turns on an exaction’s predicted 
effects (like Cooter and Siegel’s) or an inquiry into how it actually functions 
(like the Court’s in NFIB). And this is where Kavanaugh ultimately ends up 
when, toward the end of his dissent, he speculates –– but does not draw any 
conclusions — about how a court would answer the threshold constitutional 
question of whether the ACA coverage requirement should be analyzed as a 
tax or penalty. 
Kavanaugh seems genuinely uncertain about the effect that such 
labeling might have on this constitutional question. This is difficult because 
of contradictory assertions –– both of which Kavanaugh seems to take 
seriously. Those supporting the taxing choice theory point to the low penalty 
amount and CBO estimates of the people who will choose to pay the 
assessment, though Kavanaugh questions the assumptions upon which this 
“choice” theory is based: 
Such an argument assumes that citizens care only about economic 
incentives and not also about complying with The Law. Plaintiffs vigorously 
contest that assertion. According to plaintiffs, the United States does not 
necessarily consist of 310 million people who have over-absorbed their 
Posner and equate (i) a traditional regulatory tax that incentivizes or 
disincentivizes certain behavior and (ii) a legal mandate or prohibition 
accompanied by a tax penalty of the same amount. After all, plaintiffs say, 
common sense tells us that many citizens want to be law-abiding (and 
known as law-abiding), and that their desire to be law-abiding affects their 
behavior.122 
Kavanaugh never tells us how to resolve this dilemma because he feels it is 
premature. He suggests a potentially easy fix that might make the question 
disappear: if the “penalty” label is changed to a “tax” one then the 
government is sending a singular message that should make classification 
 
 120. Id. at 30 n.11 (citing to Office of Tax Policy, Dep’t of the Treasury, Report to the 
Congress on Penalty and Interest Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 36 (1999)) 
(emphasis added). 
 121. Id. (citing to the Exec. Task Force for the Commissioner’s Penalty Study, Report on 
Civil Tax Penalties at III-1 & X-1 (1989)). 
 122. Seven-Sky, 631 F.3d at 49. 
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easy. If not, the juxtaposition of legal choice and an expressive mandate 
complicates the constitutional question because the proper constitutional 
framework depends in part on behavioral predictions and assumptions that 
have either been ignored, not well supported or explained, or appear to be 
inconsistent. 
It is this discussion to which Cooter and Siegel refer as they consider 
whether the economic or “material” effects of the ACA trump its “expressive” 
characteristics. Unfortunately, Cooter and Siegel’s discussion of the 
potential expressive function of law is not very helpful in this regard. Cooter 
and Siegel dismiss these expressive law concerns and their relevance to 
constitutional analysis too quickly.123 They make the same mistake that 
Kavanaugh identified in the government’s argument: they conclude that the 
material effects (consistent with a tax) trump the expressive effects (consistent 
with a penalty) based on an assumption that “most people care more about 
their private costs than social costs” and that “most people respond by 
comparing the exaction to their private benefit for the conduct.”124 
According to the authors, private costs, defined primarily in economic terms, 
are considered paramount in predicting consumer behavior under the ACA, 
which seems to assume that people are hyper-rationalized, profit-
maximizing actors.125 
V.  UNDERSTANDING THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF LAW 
NFIB, Cooter and Siegel’s article, and Judge Kavanaugh’s decision, all 
call attention to the expressive function of the ACA, and its role in 
complicating our understanding of the ACA for constitutional purposes and 
for predicting reform success. Still missing though is a useful explanation for 
exactly how and why this expressive function could matter. What 
assumptions about the expressive effects of the ACA have led to such 
different and heated conclusions about whether a taxing choice or mandate 
with penalty conception is the right one? Can a closer look at the 
assumptions that underlie the classification of a hybrid like the ACA 
 
 123. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1230-36, 1246-47 (“In sum, the ACA’s 
exaction for noninsurance is mixed because it has a penalty’s expression and a tax’s 
materiality [but] [b]ecause the predicted effect of the ACA’s exaction for noninsurance is to 
dampen uninsured behavior, not to prevent it, it is a tax equivalent for purposes of Congress’ 
tax power.”). Cooter and Siegel note later, however, that although the effects may not be able 
to be predicted with certainty, it is not a court’s job to make this prediction. It is enough that 
the Court finds that Congress could have rationally concluded that an exaction would dampen 
conduct instead of prevent it. Id. at 1233. 
 124. Id. at 1231-32 n.165. 
 125. Id. (“Whether a tax or penalty should be used to regulate behavior depends on 
whether the amount is enough to cause people to internalize the social cost created by certain 
conduct.”). 
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coverage provision provide a more satisfying and coherent defense of 
Roberts’ approach? What might these assumptions mean for the success of 
reform? If the ACA’s expressive effects are so easily trumped by its material 
effects, then will enough people buy insurance and participate in the market 
to ensure affordable coverage? The remainder of the Article will explore 
these questions, beginning with an overview of law’s expressive function and 
theories about how this can influence behavior. 
A. Expressive Law Theory as a Critique of Law and Economics 
Expressive law theorists understand the expressive characteristics, 
dimensions, or functions of law to mean the “cultural consequences of 
choice –– [] the values that a particular policy choice, in the specific context 
in which it is taken, will be generally understood to endorse.”126 This is 
important because their central claim is that law has an expressive influence 
on behavior independent of any effect created by its sanctions; that is, law 
affects behavior expressively by what it says rather than by what it does.127 
Expressive law theories are, in part, a critique on the traditional law and 
economics approach, which focused exclusively, or primarily, on individuals 
as rational actors driven to maximize economic benefit. 
Although not fully developed, we see hints of this traditional approach in 
Cooter and Siegel’s focus on the “material” effects of the assessment based 
on the amount, and their dismissal of the significance of possible expressive 
effects of the law to influence behavior. Underlying their assertion that 
“people care more about their private costs than social costs”128 are implicit 
assumptions that private costs and benefits are understood primarily in 
economic terms, and that private and social costs are easily distinguished. 
NFIB implicitly adopts this approach by focusing only on the sanctions and 
character of enforcement to determine whether the financial costs of 
uninsurance were significant enough to essentially leave one no choice but 
to buy insurance. 
The problem, expressive law theorists say, is that this traditional 
approach fails to account for the way that social norms, and the stigma or 
esteem that results from rejecting or complying with such norms, can 
influence people’s behavior independently of other sanctions or 
enforcement threats. For instance, Lawrence Lessig has criticized the legal 
profession for ignoring the way governments “act to construct the social 
 
 126. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 66 (1995). 
 127. See id. at 66-71; see generally Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of 
Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of 
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031-32 (1996). 
 128. Cooter & Siegal, supra note 67, at 1232 n.165. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] A MORAL MANDATE & THE MEANING OF CHOICE 299 
structures, or social norms, or . . . the social meanings that surround us,” 
despite the fact that this idea is well understood in social theory.129 Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Pildes have mounted similar criticisms, noting that 
“[s]ometimes people do not behave as economists predict –– deviating in 
ways that do not appear to maximize their ‘expected utility’ often because of 
social norms . . . . Costs and benefits include the consequences of acting 
inconsistently or consistently with social norms.”130 Sunstein offers an 
example of rational decision-making that accounts for the role of social 
norms: 
[C]hoice is, roughly speaking, a function of the intrinsic utility of choice, the 
reputational utility of choice, and the effects of choice on a person’s self-
conception. If someone cleans up after his dog, or fails to do so, his 
decision may reflect not only the act’s intrinsic value, but also anticipate 
reputational effects as well as effects on the agent’s self-esteem. We can 
thus extend the game theoretic insight that a person’s behavior often 
depends on expectations about behavior by other people. Behavior and 
choice are a product not only of other people’s behavior, but also of the 
perceived judgments of other people, and those judgments have a great 
deal to do with –– indeed they constitute –– social norms. People act in 
accordance with their perceptions of what other people think. Sometimes 
they act strategically in order to avoid other people’s opprobrium. It follows 
that individual rationality and self-interest are a function of social norms and 
are not sensibly opposed to them.131 
Though government can use its expressive power in conjunction with 
robust enforcement and punitive sanctions to coerce people into complying 
with the law, the more interesting case to expressive law theorists, and the 
more relevant one for purposes of considering the ACA mandate, is how 
government can use its expressive power to influence behavior in the 
absence of meaningful enforcement or sanctions. This power has received 
the most attention in the areas of antidiscrimination and criminal law, but 
government’s ability to harness this power in the regulatory arena should not 
be underestimated. Sunstein has shown that the expressive goal of much 
regulation is to “reconstruct existing norms and to change the social 
meaning of action through a legal expression or statement about 
 
 129. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 947, 956 
(1995). 
 130. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909-10 
(1996); see also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 126, at 66 (noting that the weakness with cost-
benefit approaches is that “they necessarily focus on the quantitative or material effects of 
policies [and] cannot take into account [] the expressive dimensions of legal and political 
choices”). 
 131. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 127, at 2022, 2031-32. 
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appropriate behavior.”132 It is generally accepted as legitimate and standard 
for government to use its expressive power to counter existing norms that 
may be harmful or an impediment to well-being, especially where the harm 
is a collective one that demands some kind of intervention or coordination 
by a third party –– like the government.133 This is particularly visible in the 
areas of public health and safety.134 But scholars have also demonstrated 
how government and powerful industry players in the financial arena have 
successfully leveraged the expressive power of law and social norms to 
influence people’s financial decisions, especially as it concerns debt.135 
Evidence of the government’s expressive power in both of these 
regulatory arenas — health and safety, on the one hand, and financial 
regulation, on the other, may have significant implications for the 
government’s ability to implement health reform successfully. Affordable 
coverage is critical for healthcare access, but affordable coverage is only 
possible if enough people become consumers in the individual market. And 
as already noted in the first three sections, the ACA’s regulatory structure 
does not actually create a true legal mandate for consumers to buy 
insurance, nor is the economic penalty viewed by most people as high 
enough to influence people as a purely economic matter. But if the 
government has already successfully leveraged its expressive power in the 
health, safety, and financial arenas, it might be able to do the same in order 
to solve a serious collective action problem with important health and 
financial dimensions. Before exploring this specific claim, it is necessary to 
flesh out exactly how and why law may have an expressive influence in some 
cases. 
B. How Does Law Expressively Influence Behavior? 
Scholars’ claims about the influence of expressive law in any given case 
are subject to debate, in part because of uncertainty about exactly how law 
expressively influences the behavior of any one individual. A full exploration 
of the merits and weaknesses of the types of studies used to support 
expressive law theories is beyond the scope of the article, but even 
expressive law theorists acknowledge that it is difficult to establish clear 
 
 132. Id. at 2031; see also Lessig, supra note 129, at 956 (“If social meanings exist, they 
are also used. They not only constitute, or guide, or constrain; they are also tools - means to a 
chosen end whether an individually or collectively chosen end. They are a resource - a 
semiotic resource - that society provides to all if it provides to any. They are a way ‘for hitting 
each other and coercing one another to conform to something [one has] in mind’; or for 
inspiring another or inducing another to do, or believe, or want, in a certain way.”). 
 133. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 130, at 967. 
 134. See id. at 910. 
 135. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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causal relationships between a law’s expressive value and one’s behavior. 
This could explain why courts were reluctant to do a meaningful inquiry into 
the potential punitive expressive effects of the ACA for constitutional 
purposes. As imperfect as a law and economics approach may be, it has 
some predictive power and is more consistent with the taxing choice theory 
adopted by the Court in NFIB. That said, scholars have offered explanations 
for the different ways that government can expressively influence people’s 
behavior, which are useful for understanding how the ACA may impact 
people’s choice to buy insurance. 
Law may impact decision-making in the absence of the threat of legal or 
significant economic sanction in different ways. For example, the expressive 
message of a law may reflect existing social norms, such that violation of 
these norms invites stigma or shame. Law can also be used deliberately to 
try to change or redefine the social meaning of behavior by altering the 
social “cost” of that behavior, in ways that impact people’s choices. These 
kinds of effects presume three things. First, as noted above, they presume 
that the perceived judgments of other people matter and that people will act 
in accordance with what others think.136 Second, they depend on the 
behavior being easily visible, so that one who violates the norm is 
vulnerable to stigma or reputational harm.137 Finally, there is a presumption 
that the law reflects social norms: people motivated by a desire to seek 
approval or avoid disapproval consider the social consequences of acting 
inconsistently or consistently with norms established by the law.138 
One common illustration of this phenomenon occurs in the context of 
laws requiring people to clean up after their dogs. Sunstein explains how 
such law might expressively influence people to comply despite the absence 
of meaningful enforcement: 
Consider, for example, laws that forbid littering and laws that require people 
to clean up after their dogs. In many localities such laws are rarely enforced 
through the criminal law, but they have an important effect in signaling 
appropriate behavior and in inculcating the expectation of social 
opprobrium and, hence, shame in those who deviate from the announced 
norm. With or without enforcement activity, such laws can help reconstruct 
norms and the social meaning of action. Someone who fails to clean up 
after his dog may then be showing disrespect or even contempt for others. 
Many, most, or all people may see things this way, and the result can be 
large changes in behavior. Eventually there can be norm cascades, as 
 
 136. Sunstein, supra note 127, at 2032; see also McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of 
Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 340. 
 137. Lessig, supra note 129, at 1015. 
 138. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 340.  This 
reflects an assumption that democratically-produced legislative outcomes are positively 
correlated with popular attitudes and signal of these attitudes. Id. 
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reputational incentives shift behavior in new directions. It should be 
unsurprising to find that, in many places, people clean up after their dogs 
even though this is not especially pleasant and even though the laws are 
rarely enforced.139 
A more powerful and relevant example of this expressive power occurs 
in the case of underwater mortgages and the concern about people walking 
away from their mortgages. In his paper titled Underwater and Not Walking 
Away: Shame Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, Brent 
White explores the reasons why the vast majority of underwater homeowners 
continue to make their mortgage payments, even when it is clearly not in 
their best financial interest to do so.140 White argues that, in some cases, 
homeowners “ignore market and legal norms under which strategic default 
might not only be a viable option, but also the wisest financial decision 
[because] they have been encouraged to behave in accordance with social 
and moral norms that require individuals to keep their promises and honor 
financial obligations.”141 White traces how the government, financial 
industry, and other “social control agents” cultivated these norms causing 
homeowners to associate foreclosure with fear, shame, and guilt, and how 
homeowners’ desire to avoid shame is what drives many people to continue 
paying their mortgage, even when they know it is against their financial 
interest.142 White’s example shows how government can successfully 
leverage its expressive power to shape or create social meaning and norms 
that can overcome compelling countervailing factors and interests to 
influence behavior. This is likely due, in part, to the fact that the foreclosure 
process itself provides multiple opportunities for government and private 
actors to bombard underwater homeowners with shaming messages, as well 
as the fact that even after the foreclosure, the effect of a foreclosure on 
one’s credit report ensures that the decision to walk away, and thus the 
 
 139. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 127, at 2032-33. 
 140. Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame Fear and the Social 
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 971-72 (2010) (noting that 
many of these homeowners are “hundreds of thousands of dollars underwater and have no 
reasonable prospect of recouping their losses”, and noting that this “includes [] homeowners 
who live in ‘nonrecourse states’ [] where lenders cannot pursue defaulting homeowners for a 
deficiency judgment.”). White acknowledges behavioral economists’ arguments that some of 
these homeowners may suffer from cognitive biases that make it difficult to understand 
whether they would in fact be better off if they walked away. He claims that this fails to explain 
the cases where homeowners are aware that it would be in their best financial interest to walk 
away, but nonetheless make an apparently irrational financial decision to keep paying. Id. at 
972. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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stigma associated with it, would continue to be visible to others in the 
future.143 
An external threat of shame or promise of esteem (the “reputational 
utility of choice”) may not necessarily be the motivating factor or cost in any 
particular individual’s decision. Certainly threat of reputational harm may 
play a more important role where law is being used to actively change an 
existing norm that is strongly preferred by individuals. But in the absence of 
such a strong contrary preference, some individuals may be motivated to 
change their behavior by a strong internal sense of fairness to follow the 
norms established or reflected by the law.144 In these cases, the visibility of 
the behavior or opportunity for shaming becomes less relevant for 
compliance, as long as the law’s message is communicated clearly and 
consistently. 
In some cases, law may create or change norms “by signaling the 
underlying attitudes of a community or society.”145 In this way, the law can 
make visible a social meaning that may have been “hidden” previously, 
which facilitates the realization of a behavioral norm that is more consistent 
with people’s preferences by making it easier for people to engage in the 
desirable behavior, or to stop the undesirable behavior. This might happen 
in a couple of ways. It could be that the law, by affirming existing attitudes 
of a “silent majority” in a visible and expressively forceful way, empowers 
this majority to become more vocal and exert social pressure on those who 
violate legal norms. Take public smoking bans as an example. Even without 
the threat of legal compliance, nonsmokers (and even occasional smokers 
who find they like the idea of a ban in certain settings) may feel entitled to 
“enforce” the law through social sanctions — confrontation and shaming of 
those who violate the law. This confrontation and shaming creates a social 
cost to the act of smoking in violation of the ban, which may be significant 
enough to alter the smoker’s behavior. The greater the pressure, and the 
more widespread the use of social sanctions become, the more people’s 
beliefs shift to embrace a smoke-free environment as the new behavioral 
norm. 
Alternatively, the law may help change social norms by ambiguating the 
meaning attached to particular behavior. Take laws requiring motorcycle 
helmets for example. If people are given a choice to wear helmets or not, 
then the community of riders may assign their own social meaning to the 
choice, which can impact people’s decisions. Riding without a helmet may 
signal a valuing of freedom, the willingness to take risks, or even a belief 
 
 143. Id. at 996-1007. 
 144. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 344-45 
nn. 12-17. 
 145. Id. at 340. 
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about what it means to get an “authentic” riding experience.146 This can be 
used deliberately to, or can inadvertently, create a stigma that attaches to 
those who choose to wear a helmet. The extent to which one’s reputational 
utility is harmed by wearing a helmet, many people will likely choose to ride 
without to avoid the stigma, even if they would prefer to wear one or would 
otherwise be indifferent. But when law requires helmets, it ambiguates the 
meaning of choosing to wear one: Is it that someone is not daring and free 
enough, or is it just that they want to avoid getting an expensive ticket? In 
this way, law can undermine prior stigmatizing messages that were 
impediments to people choosing to act in ways they may prefer and that is 
certainly more desirable from the government’s perspective. 
Relatedly, law can serve an educative function that helps illuminate a 
norm that was previously invisible or suppressed due to a lack of 
information.147 The expressive messaging of law can be used to update 
people’s existing beliefs about the costs and benefits of a particular action 
(such as the health risks of smoking or the danger of not wearing a seat 
belt) that leads people to change their behavior (stop smoking or buckle up) 
in ways that are more consistent with their own desire for health and 
safety.148 Thus in promoting or defending such laws, the government gives 
people new information about a risk or problem, which leads them to act in 
ways that are more consistent with their preexisting value of health and 
safety, and which, in turn, leads to the kind of behavior the government 
wants to promote. 
Finally, the moral meaning and stigma attached to a violation is likely a 
function of the degree and type of harm one is understood to be causing. If 
second-hand smoke is simply unpleasant, a violator may be stigmatized as 
rude. But once people understand that smoke also increases one’s risk of 
serious health problems, violators may be viewed much more harshly, as 
 
 146. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 129, at 964 & n.54 (mentioning the struggle around the 
social meaning of helmets and attempts to increase their use in the United States). Lessig 
provides a much richer discussion of two other examples of helmets and social meaning. His 
first example looks at how the changing political meaning of helmets in Russia was shaped by 
government in ways that first discouraged and then encouraged their use. Id. at 963-65. His 
second example focuses on the use of helmets in hockey and is more directly analogous to my 
discussion of how rules or law can be used to change the meaning of wearing motorcycle 
helmets in the U.S. to encourage use. Id. at 967-68. 
 147. Id.; see also McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 
340 (noting that individuals are sensitive to new information); Sunstein, Social Norms and 
Social Roles, supra note 130, at 913-14 (“There is a thin line between education and 
provision of information on the one hand and attempted norm-change on the other. [I]n the 
process of norm management, government has a number of tools.”). 
 148. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 130, at 948-49; Alex Geisenger, 
A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 53-55 (2002). 
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showing contempt for others and thus deserving of contempt in return. This 
knowledge may then influence the frequency and intensity with which 
nonsmokers are willing to confront violators, which in turn, raises the 
reputational harm and thus the social cost of violating such bans.149 In this 
way, increased knowledge about the risks of smoking may also create 
greater awareness and sensitivity in smokers because of their own internal 
sense of fairness and value of health, which causes them to change their 
behavior –– to embrace rules that limit smoking and even to try to quit. 
Expressive law theory provides a very rich picture of the many ways in 
which law can influence people’s choices in the absence of legal or serious 
economic sanction. Unfortunately, this richness also limits its predictive 
power because any one, or more likely some combination, of these theories 
may be operating in any given instance to influence an individual’s behavior 
based on his or her own internal norms, how visible social norms are, and 
one’s sensitivity and exposure to external shaming based on these social 
norms. 
C. The Strength of Government Messaging and Expressive Power 
Taking a closer look at the different ways in which law may influence 
behavior in the above examples should make clear that merely passing a 
law or making a pronouncement does not magically and instantly transform 
social meaning. Expressive law scholars recognize that the influence may be 
direct or indirect, and may occur over time by gradually shifting the 
equilibrium to a point where the desired behavior increases and a greater 
portion of the public has internalized this as the new norm.150 Whether the 
public internalizes certain norms and how quickly norms shift depend on a 
number of factors, such as the visibility of the message, the credibility of the 
source of the information, and the consistency and clarity of the message; 
these factors, in turn, determine law’s expressive power. 
Generally, government has a huge advantage in shaping social 
meaning, in part because the uniqueness and emphatic means of 
government speech helps to guarantee a minimal level of credibility and 
sincerity that demands the public’s attention. Law also guarantees a 
powerful forum for publicizing the new norm. The ACA is a perfect example 
of this as it has received overwhelming attention in the mainstream media. 
President Obama’s use of the bully pulpit to tout and explain healthcare 
reform repeatedly, as well as the Administration’s use of its websites to 
highlight the benefits of reform and to generate anticipation for enrollment 
 
 149. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Keynote: Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: 
Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2000) (explaining this 
phenomenon in the context of owners picking up after their dogs). 
 150. See, e.g., Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 130, at 928-30. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
306 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:267 
in 2014, are examples of the powerful tools available to government 
speakers.151 Moreover, the government’s presumption of credibility in 
messaging and in predictions about behavior are illustrated by scholars and 
judges’ reliance on CBO statistics estimating the amount of revenue the 
ACA penalty will generate based on predictions of the number of consumers 
who will forego buying insurance despite being subject to the mandate. 
Clarity of message will be a big challenge, however, because of the 
law’s complexity. This complexity has made it easy for opponents to feed 
voters wrong information, such as the creation of death panels, which fuels 
public fear and opposition. Where government is trying to solve a multi-
faceted collective action problem, such as the healthcare access/cost 
problem that requires facilitating coordination between many different public 
and private actors, it may require a massive technical, detailed, and 
complex regulatory scheme that can seem impenetrable to consumers, 
making it difficult to construct a clear, consistent and powerful expressive 
message.152 
Trust is also a critical factor in determining whether consumers embrace 
the ACA’s moral messaging. In an environment where issues are highly 
politicized and public mistrust of the public or private actors delivering the 
message is salient, the expressive characteristics of law may not have as 
much moral or practical force for everyone. Such polarization has certainly 
characterized the health reform debate, but this polarization was largely 
fueled by legal challenges to the law that have been settled, and the heated 
rhetoric is starting to die down. 
One complicating factor is that while the federal government is the 
creator of the ACA and has been its key promoter so far, states will have to 
play a key role, and trust is generally greater the closer the public is to the 
lawmakers delivering the message. In states that are embracing reform and 
acting in partnership with the federal government, this can strengthen the 
credibility and force of the federal government’s message. In states that are 
resisting health reform, or only proceeding in a grudging way, the message 
will likely get diluted or overwhelmed by contradictory messages from 
officials who are vocal opponents of reform and closer to the people that 
the federal government needs to reach. 
 
 151. See, e.g., The Healthcare Law & You, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/ 
law/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013); see also Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/healthreform/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013). 
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Another variable is the role of consumer groups and public interest 
organizations. Groups advocating for greater healthcare access are playing 
a key role in providing consumers information about reform generally and 
specifically about enrollment through the exchanges. These consumer 
organizations are already trusted by certain constituencies, and to the extent 
the government is able to elicit help from these trusted private partners, this 
can give its message greater force and credibility. On the other hand, 
organizations mobilized against reform continue to use legal and social 
action to undermine reform efforts with their constituencies as well. 
Although there are many variables that impact the government’s ability 
to craft and publicize its message effectively, the federal government has 
successfully leveraged its expressive power before, and a close look at its 
reform rhetoric suggests its intent to do this again to try to ensure adequate 
participation in the new private insurance expansion. Although expressive 
law theories do not have predictive power, they do provide a framework for 
thinking about how the ACA could expressively encourage consumer 
participation in the new market despite legal choice and weak economic 
sanctions. The final part of this Article explores this by analyzing the 
expressive messages of the health reform law, existing norms that the ACA is 
trying to change, and the potential effects on certain groups of the 
uninsured, including the “young and healthy,” those deemed higher risk, 
and those adamantly opposed to the ACA. 
D. The Expressive Force of Penalties Versus Taxes 
Before exploring this potential expressive effect, one might wonder about 
the importance of an expressive “mandate” as opposed to a “tax” label in 
light of the obvious regulatory character of the shared responsibility 
payment. Expressive law scholars note that when the government decides to 
tax or subsidize an action, this is another way of constructing social 
meaning. Regardless of whether an assessment is labeled as a tax or a 
penalty, does this not send a clear message that buying insurance is the 
desirable action? 
A number of people have questioned the effectiveness of taxes as a 
regulatory tool. In a recent paper on Taxation as Regulation, Tax Law 
Scholar Reuven Avi-Yonah says that while regulation may be a legitimate 
goal of taxation in some cases, it can not effectively serve that function for 
the ACA.153 Avi-Yonah gives two reasons for this. First, as a policy matter, 
the “health care tax,” as he calls it, is relatively complex, has difficult rules 
 
 153. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax 
and Other Regulatory Taxes 2-3 (U. Michigan Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
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defining when it even applies, and disproportionately impacts the poor.154 
Second, he says that calling it a tax “may dilute its effect because people 
tend to have a different reaction to not paying taxes than to avoiding 
penalties.”155 In other words, it does not convey a clear, strong social norm 
about the importance of buying health insurance or to whom the obligation 
attaches. 
Health law scholar John Blum offers an even more troubling critique of 
the problem with government’s uses of “sin taxes” to perform a regulatory 
function. In his article, Sin Tax, Forgiveness and Public Health Governance, 
Blum focuses on traditional sin taxes like taxes on alcohol and tobacco, 
highlighting the disconnect between the government’s regulatory goals of 
behavior modification with its goals of revenue generation.156 He notes that 
these goals are “ultimately contradictory as success in changing public 
behavior would negatively impact the potential of such taxation to raise 
revenue.”157 More importantly, however, he suggests that the “tax” label 
may implicitly send a message that reinforces existing bad norms and 
contradicts the government’s regulatory goals: 
A lesser explored approach to sin taxes is to analyze the implicit message of 
this taxing strategy as a type of license to engage in the very conduct such 
an instrument is directed to prevent. Pushing the implicit inquiry, it can be 
argued that sin taxes extend beyond a mere gesture of acquiescence and 
constitute a deliberate form of public forgiveness. Unlike most forms of 
forgiveness that have been identified in the literature, sin tax seen as a 
modern day indulgence may, in fact, promote a public health policy that is 
both irresponsible and counterproductive.158 
Thus, calling the shared responsibility payment a “tax” could send a 
message that the tax is not only a legally equivalent choice to buying 
insurance, but is equivalent as a moral or policy matter, which would 
undermine the government’s primary goal of getting people to buy 
 
 154. Id. at 8. This criticism is borne out by polling as of July 2012. See KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: JULY 2012, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff. 
org/kaiserpolls/upload/8339-F.pdf [hereinafter KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL JULY 2012] 
(“There is confusion over who will be subject to the tax penalty under the mandate: the poll 
finds that one in five Americans believe they will have to pay a penalty in 2014, even as 
experts suggest the share will be considerably smaller.”). 
 155. Avi-Yonah, supra note 153, at 8. This too is borne out by the July 2012 Kaiser poll: 
“[U]pwards of six in ten [still view] the mandate unfavorably whether it is described as a ‘tax’ or 
as a ‘fine.’” KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL JULY 2012, supra note 154. 
 156. John D. Blum, Sin Tax, Forgiveness and Public Health Governance 1-2 (Loyola Univ. 
Chicago Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2012-010, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=204267. 
 157. Id. at 2. 
 158. Id. at 1-2. 
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insurance. If the tax is viewed as adequate compensation for the social cost 
of failing to buy insurance, it creates implicit moral permission to stay 
uninsured. This, in turn, means that one’s decision to buy insurance is more 
likely to only turn on the kind of “private costs and benefits” referred to by 
Cooter and Siegel. 
Another question presented by the ACA mandate is why any incentive or 
sanction is needed at all in light of what seems to be widespread public 
understanding of the importance of, and desire for, health insurance.159 
Unlike traditional sin taxes, the “health care tax” is not designed to prevent 
or dampen behavior that people enjoy or to which they may even be 
addicted. Rather the ACA’s tax/penalty operates as an additional incentive 
to do something that would provide a clear benefit to people –– to be able 
to access healthcare and avoid potentially ruinous financial debt. Indeed, 
this was the assumption underlying President Obama’s initial resistance to a 
mandate. 
One cannot simply assume, however, that public expressions of a desire 
for affordable insurance coverage will automatically translate into a decision 
to buy insurance on the new health benefit exchanges, even if the ACA 
makes insurance “affordable” by government’s standards. People often 
express preferences or support policies as citizens (through voting, for 
example) that may not be consistent with the personal decisions they make 
in their day-to-day lives.160 Moreover, although the public may understand 
the importance of insurance and even desire it in the abstract, whether any 
individual values it enough to purchase it is a more complicated question. 
The “benefit” of insurance may be valued differently based on one’s prior 
experiences and anticipated health needs. And the cost of buying insurance 
must be understood not only as its price (which is unpredictable), but in 
terms of the value of trade-offs. Insurance deemed “affordable” under the 
law will likely still require those without a lot of disposable income to give up 
 
 159. This is distinct from the narrower and more politicized (and misleading) question 
about whether people supported President Obama’s healthcare reform (otherwise referred to 
as “Obamacare”). 
 160. See Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 130, at 959-60 (“There is 
an evident and pervasive difference between people’s choices as consumers and their choices 
as citizens. This is because people are choosing quite different things. In their private capacity, 
people may watch silly situation comedies; but they may also support, as citizens, the use of 
government resources to assist public broadcasting. Some people seek stringent laws 
protecting the environment or endangered species even though they do not use the public 
parks or derive material benefits from protection of endangered species – and even though in 
their private behavior, they are unwilling to do much to protect environmental amenities . . . . 
[W]hat people favor as political participants can be different from what they favor as 
consumers. It is in part for this reason that democratic outcomes are distinct from those that 
emerge from markets.”). 
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other goods or services in order to be able to purchase insurance. The 
trade-offs one is willing to make depends not only on how much consumers 
value insurance, but also the importance or value of the goods they would 
need to give up. It is impossible to predict how these trade-offs will factor 
into each individual’s decision making, complicating even the more 
traditional law and economic approach to predicting behavior. 
Thus, both the “taxing” and “penalty” approaches create uncertainty 
about what choices people will make under the law. But the 
penalty/mandate rhetoric is more likely to create a powerful expressive 
message that enables the federal government to achieve its regulatory goals 
regardless of the amount of economic sanction. The next part considers 
whether the ACA creates a sufficiently powerful expressive message to 
influence people to buy insurance rather than pay the tax/penalty. 
VI.  THE ACA’S MORAL MANDATE: DEFINING THE MEANING OF CHOICE 
In light of the fact that the ACA gives consumers a legal choice to not 
buy insurance and that the economic sanctions are too low to exert 
meaningful pressure on consumers to buy insurance, the federal 
government will likely need to harness the ACA’s expressive power to 
generate adequate consumer participation. This part takes a closer look at 
the potential of this power. Sections A and B identify the norms that the ACA 
is trying to change and create. Section C considers more specifically how 
this expressive function may influence people’s behavior. 
A. Norms Pre-ACA 
Few scholars have considered the expressive or norming function of 
insurance. Deborah Stone provides one of the more in-depth discussions of 
insurance, asserting that it “is a social institution that particularly invites 
moral contemplation about suffering, compassion, and responsibility [and 
in] so doing [] enlarges the public conception of social responsibility.”161 
Unfortunately, prior to the ACA, we did not have a comprehensive national 
discussion that allowed public contemplation about whether the health 
policy decisions being made were fair, smart, and part of a coherent moral 
philosophy about the role and responsibility of government and other actors 
in the system. Rather, much of health policy has been crafted in a 
piecemeal, incremental, and often opaque fashion. This does not mean that 
it is impossible to identify norms or discern social meaning of action from 
our pre-ACA healthcare delivery and financing system. But to the extent that 
 
 161. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, in 
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 52, 54 (Tom Baker 
& Jonathan Simon eds., 2002). 
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program design or certain conduct by insurers, government, or individuals 
has any social meaning, it is often the product of messages or norms that 
arise unintentionally out of an incoherent patchwork of public entitlements 
and private market experiences that can make meaning hard to discern. 
Recall that the expressive value of law depends on clarity, visibility and the 
meaning of signals, and context is critically important for drawing moral 
inferences from action or inaction.162 
1. Healthcare Financing Patchwork 
In order to identify the norms and values communicated through the 
pre-ACA system, it is first important to understand the system design, 
including which groups have fallen through the cracks and why. Private 
insurance coverage depends heavily on employment, and employment-
based insurance tends to be more affordable than insurance purchased on 
the individual market, in part because of the greater bargaining power of 
employers and a healthier pool of employees. But it is also more affordable 
because of special legal protections for employees that prevent 
individualized risk rating and denials of coverage, as well as favorable tax 
treatment that creates significant financial incentives for employers to 
subsidize the cost, reducing the premiums employees must pay.163 Those 
without access to employment-based insurance –– especially those in low-
wage positions and certain service sectors, part-time and temporary 
employees, and the self-employed –– are left to fend for themselves in an 
individual insurance market that is largely unregulated. Insurance 
underwriting practices that were legal pre-ACA, such as denials of people 
deemed too risky, exclusions of care that people need most, and risk rating, 
have kept the people in greatest need of care from getting it.164 Moreover, 
in the last several years frequent rate increases that have not been justified 
actuarially have resulted in greater numbers of even “healthy” people being 
effectively excluded from the market.165 
Although there is no constitutional right for all citizens to healthcare,166 
public programs like Medicare and Medicaid create statutory entitlements to 
 
 162. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 127, at 2040 (noting that the 
“complex network of norms governing the purchase of insurance” makes it difficult to infer 
social meaning from the failure of purchase insurance). In that case, Sunstein was talking 
about whether any relevant judgment could be made about the lack of insurance for purposes 
of determining tort liability. 
 163. See Hoffman, supra note 48. 
 164. Id. at 49. 
 165. Id. 
 166. One narrow exception is applied to those detained by the government. The Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” has been interpreted to 
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insurance coverage for certain groups –– traditionally the elderly, those 
disabled by illness or injury, very poor children, pregnant women, and some 
families with children. This system has tended to exclude the working poor 
and childless adults who are also effectively excluded from an insurance 
market dominated by powerful insurers allowed to deny coverage or set 
rates at prohibitively expensive levels. Millions of children also remained 
uninsured under the old system because their families were not poor enough 
to qualify for public insurance, yet were too poor to afford insurance in the 
private individual insurance market. Finally, many documented immigrants 
have also fallen into this category because federal law temporarily excludes 
them from public benefits, and they often work in jobs that do not offer 
health benefits. 
It is also important to understand the individual and societal harms 
suffered as a result of the coverage gaps that existed pre-ACA. Numerous 
studies have shown that lack of insurance is an impediment to healthcare 
access, contributes to poor health outcomes, and has been a significant 
factor in many bankruptcies.167 Moreover, the individual and societal costs 
of uninsurance have been growing in light of several troubling trends: job 
loss caused by economic downturns; cost-shifting to privately insured 
consumers and the government to subsidize uncompensated medical care; 
unnecessary health expenditures to treat otherwise preventable conditions 
and medical crises; and threats to the healthcare infrastructure, especially 
the safety net providers serving large numbers of uninsured and Medicaid 
beneficiaries. Healthcare reform is a response to this evidence of a growing 
crisis.168 
2. Government Messaging 
One clear and consistent message from the federal government 
regarding healthcare is that there is no constitutional right to healthcare, 
and thus no legal duty by government to ensure affordable healthcare for 
all. Unfortunately, some federal and state officials have also made off-hand 
and inaccurate remarks suggesting that insurance is not even that important 
 
require treatment for prisoners’ serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
104 (1976). 
 167. See, e.g., Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults, 99 
AM. JUR. PUB. HEALTH 2289, 2292 (2009); David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in 
the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 743 (2009). 
 168. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E) (2011) (citing Congressional findings that “[t]he 
economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter 
lifespan of the uninsured. By significantly reducing the number of the uninsured, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce this 
economic cost.”). 
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because people can always get care in the emergency room.169 Such 
comments seem to reflect officials’ assumptions that there is no moral duty 
on the government to ensure healthcare access beyond the emergency 
room. 
Nonetheless, the federal government has played an important role in 
facilitating healthcare access, most visibly by creating public healthcare 
entitlements for certain groups, and through less visible legal protections 
and incentives that make it cheaper for some employees to purchase private 
insurance through their employers. According to Stone, these are the kinds 
of choices that invite moral contemplation about societal responsibility and 
compassion, and public entitlements are commonly understood as reflecting 
a moral duty to help those who are in need and “deserving”170 –– Medicaid 
helps the extremely poor who are also vulnerable to exclusion by the private 
market by virtue of their age, disability, or condition; Medicare helps 
beneficiaries considered deserving by virtue of having paid into the system 
and vulnerable due to advanced age. Each program has been expanded at 
various times to include more people or certain categories of people who 
seem to fit the “deserving” criterion. With each expansion or change to the 
program, there is some moral contemplation and conversation about the 
need for the expansion; but to the extent that social programs like this have 
allowed “moral contemplation” to occur, it has tended to be in a very 
segmented way, with each new policy narrowly focusing on particular 
services or groups, and without meaningful participation and understanding 
by the public at large.171 At the other end of the spectrum, economic and 
legal protections for employees with access to employment-based insurance 
has received a lot less public attention, which means even less opportunity 
for an examination of the moral justification underlying these protections. 
But in attempting to discern society’s values or norms as reflected by 
these choices, one must also consider the government’s choices to exclude 
 
 169. See, e.g., Greg Sargent, Romney: Let Them Go to Emergency Rooms, WASHINGTON 
POST OP-ED (Sep. 24, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
line/post/romney-let-them-go-to-emergency-rooms/2012/09/24/3ac90b0e-0680-11e2-afff-
d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html (discussing Romney’s comments on a CBS interview); see also 
Timothy Noah, The Emergency-Room Gap: Putting to Rest a Cherished Myth About the 
Uninsured, SLATE.COM (Apr. 14, 2010), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/prescripttions/2010/04/the_emergencyroom_gap.html. 
 170. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE 
STUDY OF MEDICAID 57, 61–62 (1974); see also Guetzkow, supra note 50 at 174 
(“‘Deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ are not categories that politicians and bureaucrats use when 
devising social policy. Deservingness is instead a second-order analytic tool used by 
researchers to help make sense of social policies – their scope, their generosity, and their 
political appeal.”). 
 171. See generally STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 170. 
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certain groups from the public system or to leave certain groups to fend for 
themselves in a dysfunctional and largely unregulated private market. It is 
unclear why, for instance, people forced to look to the individual market for 
coverage should receive less government protection than those fortunate 
enough to be employed by corporations wealthy and powerful enough to 
bargain on their employees’ behalf, or why childless adults at the federal 
poverty level are less deserving of government help than those with children. 
If the government’s piecemeal approach to healthcare design reflects a 
belief that certain groups are more “deserving” of compassion or help than 
others, then this suggests a very narrow understanding of “social 
responsibility” in healthcare. But to what extent are these beliefs consistent 
with the prevailing attitudes of the rest of society? These choices help shape 
norms with respect to insurance status: certain groups are more likely to be 
insured than others. But they also raise questions about what meaning, if 
any, attaches to the status of being insured or uninsured. 
Pre-ACA, the social meaning of not having insurance was unclear 
because of the complicated regulatory and market-based factors impacting 
such decisions. For example, to the extent that failure to get insurance was 
linked to unaffordability, some people experienced shame because of their 
failure to earn enough to afford it –– this served as yet another indicia of 
poverty which was also stigmatized. Interestingly, some of those eligible for 
Medicaid have not enrolled in order to avoid the stigma or humiliation 
associated with navigating a difficult and sometimes hostile bureaucracy that 
requires people to prove their qualifications for help. 
On the other hand, many have viewed the unaffordability of insurance 
as a signal of the unfairness created by bad actors (insurers) in the private 
system, a general moral failure of government to fix the problem, a lack of 
concern by the government for the groups most at risk of falling through the 
cracks, or some combination of all three. This sense of unfairness has grown 
as greater numbers of people have suffered job loss and lost insurance due 
to economic factors outside of their control. The implicit message received 
by these groups was “You’re on your own” –– if you were not lucky enough 
to have the right kind of job or deserving enough to receive direct 
government help. For those at the greatest risk of uninsurance –– women, 
racial and ethnic minorities, members of the LGBT community, and people 
with a chronic condition or disability that was not totally disabling –– this 
implicit message was potentially even more marginalizing and harmful. 
Because these groups have been excluded and suffered discrimination more 
broadly, especially in employment, they have fewer resources to spare and 
are more vulnerable to falling through the coverage gaps. In this way, the 
prior healthcare system could be seen as reinforcing a longstanding and 
broader inequality that devalued these groups. 
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One group further complicates attempts to glean pre-ACA norms: the 
“young and healthy.” This group is too old to qualify as dependents on a 
parent’s plan (if the parents are fortunate enough to have insurance), may 
not have a job that provides insurance, and is least likely to be able to 
appreciate the importance or value of paying for insurance as a young 
adult. Lawmakers have either deliberately or inadvertently reinforced the 
message that health insurance is not important for this group, by neglecting 
them in health policy making and by repeatedly referring to them as the 
“young and healthy.” 
3. Messaging by Private Insurers 
Discerning even implicit messages from private health insurers is a bit 
more complicated. On the one hand, the practices described above send a 
clear message that they do not want to cover people who are too “risky” — 
they deny, or charge prohibitively expensive rates to, those most in need. 
Insurance companies have also operated in other explicitly discriminatory 
ways, such as redlining to avoid predominantly minority communities, 
charging women rates higher than men, and disproportionately targeting 
certain kinds of conditions for coverage exclusions or caps, like treatment 
for HIV or mental healthcare.172 Such practices send a powerful message 
that insurers view these groups as less desirable customers and their health 
needs as less valuable. This in turn creates mistrust and resentment among 
the very people the government will need to recruit for health reform to be 
successful. 
Insurers’ practices with more “desirable” (especially healthy) customers 
are more complicated. While insurers want these customers and make them 
the focus of marketing efforts, repeated rate increases without adequate 
justification have forced many people to give up coverage before realizing 
its value, creating some resentment and mistrust. But mistrust is likely highest 
among those who have been subject to illegal rescissions or discovered that 
their plan did not provide necessary coverage after becoming seriously ill. 
The message implicitly sent: insurance is a luxury that only those with 
resources can afford, and like any other business, insurers will do what they 
can to limit expenditures and maximize profits, even if it means denying 
people’s essential health needs. 
Despite such confusing and apparently contradictory messages being 
sent in the health insurance context, Stone provides an example of how 
some private insurers have successfully leveraged their messaging power to 
shape the meaning of insurance and influence behavioral norms in the life 
 
 172. See generally INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2003). 
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insurance context. She shows how in this context, marketing by private 
insurers has played on and helped to construct notions of family 
responsibility that make insurance a moral imperative: 
In contemporary marketing, life insurance is still often portrayed as a way of 
meeting one’s family obligations and even as a way of strengthening family 
ties. “Another way to say ‘I love you’ is with good insurance protection,” 
declares one of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ads, showing Lucy 
(from Charles Schulz’s Peanuts comic strip) knitting a pair of baby 
booties.173 
In addition to this message of personal responsibility, Stone says that 
insurers have also helped to “highlight the collective, mutual-aid aspect of 
insurance and promote conversation about the contours of moral 
responsibility in a community.”174 In this way, insurance can act as a “kind 
of moral education of the citizenry.”175 
Nonetheless, Stone acknowledges that this collective aspect of insurer 
messaging can be harder to see in private insurance, “especially those 
segments that are marketed and organized as individual policies instead of 
group policies, [because they] may appear more as bilateral market 
contracts rather than any kind of community-sponsored aid system.”176 The 
opacity of the mechanics and regulatory environment of private insurance 
also obscures the role of social and collective participation in the context of 
group health insurance plans as well. Many people know it is easier to get 
health insurance through their employer, but they do not understand what 
role the government played in this. Nor do they understand the importance 
of collective participation by a large and diverse pool of relatively healthy 
people, which enables individuals to be responsible by purchasing 
affordable coverage. Thus discerning norms or meaning in the pre-ACA 
health insurance context is quite complicated: it is not clear what meaning, 
if any, should be attached to one’s insurance status; it is not clear to what 
extent the public viewed healthcare as an essential good and the 
government’s piecemeal approach as a moral failure; and it is not clear to 
what extent people embraced norms of individual or social responsibility. 
The government’s explicit and implicit messages not only disclaimed 
government responsibility for healthcare broadly, but also undermined the 
possibility of discerning a clear social meaning from the state of being 
uninsured. Mixed messages sent by private insurers engendered confusion 
 
 173. Stone, supra note 161, at 57-58. 
 174. Id. at 55. Stone also claims that “private insurance marketing is a cultural force that 
legitimates social obligation and mutual aid [and also] weaves in a strong stand of individual 
responsibility and self-help.” Id. at 58. 
 175. Id. at 61. 
 176. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] A MORAL MANDATE & THE MEANING OF CHOICE 317 
and mistrust, and further ambiguated the meaning of insurance. What was 
clear, however, was that the number of uninsured was growing, and policy 
analysts were predicting that things would get worse. The state of being 
uninsured was already a norm for some groups, and without government 
intervention, the trend suggested a widening of this norm. 
B. The ACA’s Moral Mandate and Other Expressive Functions 
When an existing norm is harmful or an impediment to individual and 
societal well-being, it is appropriate for government to leverage its 
expressive power to change these norms. And this is precisely what the ACA 
tries to do. In addressing the need for healthcare reform, President Obama 
acknowledged the troubling and harmful messages communicated as a 
result of the government’s piecemeal approach. He also noted 
inconsistencies between the government’s and the public’s understanding of 
healthcare as an essential good and the government’s role in ensuring 
healthcare access for all.177 He highlighted the unfairness of a system that 
allowed for-profit insurers to control access, and government’s failure to 
protect consumers who try to act responsibly by purchasing insurance only 
to find themselves vulnerable to financial ruin or unable to get care because 
of bad faith denials, illegal rescissions, or the sale of junk insurance. 
Obama also criticized the fact that private insurance access has depended 
primarily on certain kinds of employment, especially during a recession 
when so many people were losing their jobs or did not have access to the 
kinds of jobs that provided insurance. 
Although health reform was not a radical federal transformation of the 
healthcare system,178 the ACA does have transformative potential to redefine 
 
 177. See, e.g., Katherine Brandon, The President on Health Care: “We are Going to Get 
this Done”, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 17, 2009, 5:42 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ 
The-President-on-Health-Care-We-are-Going-to-Get-this-Done; see also Peter Orszag, To 
Save Money, Save the Health Care Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A29; The Right Care at 
the Right Time: Leveraging Innovation to Improve Health Care Quality for All Americans: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance United States Senate, 110th Cong. 57-69 (2008) 
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office). 
 178. First, it does not create a “constitutional right to health care” nor is the federal 
government entering the business of delivering care; rather it uses its regulatory power to 
create a platform for a better functioning private market based largely on the kinds of 
protections against exclusion and risk rating that already existed for employees, and by 
strengthening the power to regulate rates that state regulators already had. Second, the 
federal government continues to rely heavily on and give great deference to states in both the 
structure and implementation of reform; it contemplates that it will have to play a significant 
role in operating federal exchanges for residents of states that do not create their own, but this 
does not seem to be the federal government’s preference. Finally, the ACA does not create a 
universal or centralized system of healthcare financing for all; rather it builds on our existing 
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the federal government’s normative commitment to ensuring affordable care 
for all, and to create a shared sense of commitment and responsibility to 
make this work. This transformative idea is embodied in the expressive 
characteristics of the ACA, as well as lawmakers’ messaging about the ACA. 
The ACA may not have created a true legal mandate, but this Part argues 
that the federal government uses its expressive power through the ACA to 
create a “moral mandate” for individuals to do their part by buying 
insurance based on this transformative idea of shared responsibility. 
As described earlier, the statutory language of the ACA uses mandatory 
and punitive rhetoric in describing citizens’ obligations under the law. The 
emphasis has been on the “individual coverage requirement” or mandate in 
public conversations about the law. Moreover, the law requires people who 
are subject to the mandate and fail to get insurance to pay a “shared 
responsibility payment,” also referred to as a “penalty” throughout the law. 
The label “shared responsibility payment” simultaneously expresses an 
individual obligation to buy insurance and a collective obligation to 
participate in a system in which everyone must share some responsibility for 
ensuring affordable coverage. The penalty language suggests that failure to 
buy insurance is wrongful behavior that deserves punishment, implicitly 
signaling that buying insurance (and not making the shared responsibility 
payment) is the “right” way to honor one’s individual obligation and duty to 
the collective. Finally, as noted above, the government repeatedly 
emphasized that increasing insurance coverage through the coverage 
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets, 
making clear that an individual’s failure to buy insurance has broader 
consequences that could hurt others’ ability to get care. 
Importantly, this responsibility rhetoric does not just apply to individuals; 
the ACA emphasizes a “shared responsibility” that reflects the government’s 
new priority and commitment to consumer healthcare access. In this way, 
the ACA attempts to counter the prior message of “You’re on your own” 
with a message that is more consistent with Obama’s 2012 campaign 
message, “We’re in this together.” Through the ACA, the government 
emphasizes a new commitment with benefits and responsibilities, and tries to 
educate people about the extent to which everyone’s success and well-being 
is already connected: if people come together in the new health benefit 
exchange, then this collective action can help ensure affordable insurance 
and a fair playing field for everyone; this, in turn, allows people to exercise 
their individual moral responsibility to buy insurance. Like messaging by 
private insurers in the life insurance context, the ACA’s message is one of 
 
public-private system of financing and delivery, a system that continues to be fragmented and 
depend on the voluntary participation of private insurers, providers, and consumers alike. 
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collective aid, with a healthy dose of personal responsibility; but in this case, 
the message is more visible and clear, due in large part to President 
Obama’s use of his bully pulpit in explaining the law. 
The government’s own moral and legal commitment to ensure 
affordable and meaningful coverage is a critical part of this message 
because this commitment is important for people’s acceptance of the 
mandate. For example, although polling showed the mandate itself was 
controversial, people were more likely to be supportive of the mandate if a 
public option was included –– likely because this was the clearest proxy for 
government’s assurance of affordability and meaningful protection.179 If 
consumers are being told to put their money (and faith) into a private 
insurance market mistrusted for so long, they will understandably be 
skeptical. But if consumers view the exchanges as vehicles through which 
government will protect them and help them get the care they need, the 
mandate is part of a reciprocal responsibility between government and 
individuals that makes it much more palatable. Indeed, polling shows that 
many people are predisposed to a collective system that combines mutual 
aid and individual responsibility. For example, when people who supported 
the mandate were asked to explain why in their own words, 32% said 
because everyone needs healthcare/insurance, 17% said it expands 
coverage, 16% said people should pay their fair share, and 15% said it 
controls costs.180 The same poll found that some people originally opposed 
to the mandate, changed their mind once they were informed about why the 
mandate was necessary181 and that it would not take away their 
employment-based healthcare.182 Other surveys show that significant 
 
 179. See, e.g., ISABELLA FURTH ET AL., VIEWPOINT LEARNING, INC., HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL 
CALIFORNIANS: CATCHING UP WITH THE PUBLIC: A REPORT WITH THE PUBLIC AND WITH BUSINESS 
AND CIVIC LEADERS (2006), available at http://www.viewpointlearning.com/wp-content/up 
loads/2011/04/Health_Coverage_for_All_Californians.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH COVERAGE FOR 
ALL CALIFORNIANS] (determining public views on health reform through education and dialogue 
that considered significant healthcare reforms, as opposed to simply polling people about 
piecemeal or incremental approaches). 
 180. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 29, at 2. 
 181. See id. at 3 (noting that public support for the mandate goes up depending on which 
messages or information opponents receive). The following information caused support for the 
mandate to increase: “. . . without such a requirement, insurance companies would still be 
allowed to deny coverage to people who are sick;” “. . . people would not be held to this 
requirement if the cost of new coverage would consume too large a share of their income;” 
“. . . without such a requirement, people may wait until they are seriously ill to buy health 
insurance, which will drive up health insurance costs for everyone.” Id. 
 182. Id. (“Perhaps surprisingly, the most effective information in terms of changing people’s 
minds is the basic reminder that ‘under the reform law, most Americans would still get 
coverage through their employers and so would automatically satisfy the requirement without 
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numbers of people are willing to pay more so that others can afford care.183 
By adopting a more proactive and explicit consumer protection role, the 
government is sending a message to people that such a system can exist 
and will be created through the health benefit exchanges. 
This commitment is not limited to ensuring access to affordable 
insurance; the ACA’s “Patient Protection” part of the message includes a 
commitment to ensure a benefits package that is meaningful. As an 
instrument of social reform, insurance has performed a standard-setting role 
in many arenas, and the federal government is using the ACA to help define 
a moral and legal baseline for care that is deemed essential and furthers 
equity goals.184 Although the ACA left this guarantee of “essential health 
benefits” substantially undefined, and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) punted responsibility for this to the states,185 the federal 
government has affirmed this commitment in other ways. Mandating that 
preventive care be covered without copayments is one example of this.186 
And HHS has used its expressive power to affirm its commitment to equity, 
specifically for groups that have been either excluded or not able to get 
meaningful benefits in the prior system due to express or more subtle forms 
of discrimination. Women, people with mental health conditions, and 
people with HIV are a few of the groups that the Administration has targeted 
with messages of inclusion and assurances that prior inequities or 
discrimination would be eliminated.187 
Finally, the ACA does not simply focus on the financial costs and 
benefits of insurance; healthcare access is really at the heart of the ACA’s 
messaging and even its title, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
reveals that insurance is simply a means toward this end. During Obama’s 
 
having to buy any new insurance.’ After hearing that message, favorable views of the mandate 
went up 28 percentage points to 61%.”). 
 183. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., SUPPORT FOR HEALTH CARE OVERHAUL, BUT IT’S NOT 
1993 (2009), available at http://www.people-press.org/2009/03/19/support-for-health-care-
overhaul-but-its-not-1993/. 
 184. See Stone, supra note 161, at 63. 
 185. State Selection of Benchmark, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,644, 70,648 (Nov. 26, 2012) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 156.100). 
 186. ACA § 1302(b)(1)(I) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)). 
 187. See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary Sebelius 
Announces Public-Private Partnerships to Turn the Tide Together in Fight Against HIV/AIDS 
(Jul. 22, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120722a.html; 
News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Law Gives Women Control 
over Their Care, Offers Free Preventive Services to 47 Million Women (Jul. 31, 2012), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120731a.html; News Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Law Increases Number of Mental and 
Behavioral Health Providers (Sep. 25, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/ 
2012pres/09/20120925a.html. 
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speeches about health reform, he emphasized how insurance helps people 
get the right care at the right time –– such as preventive care and on-going 
monitoring of chronic conditions to prevent the kind of crises that lead to 
hospitalization and more serious and costly problems down the line.188 Thus 
insurance is also important because of the behavioral effects it can have –– 
by encouraging people to access preventive and regular care through a 
“medical home,”189 insurance serves a teaching function that promotes 
greater individual responsibility with respect to managing health and 
promoting wellness.190 In this way, the ACA treats insurance as an 
“instrument of social reform,” seeking not only to change norms around 
insurance status, but expecting coverage to facilitate greater understanding, 
access, and responsibility in personal health management more 
generally.191 
Thus, through the ACA, the government is emphasizing the moral 
responsibility to get (and use) insurance –– a “moral mandate.” But this is 
only one part of the message –– the moral mandate is part of a new 
government commitment to society’s health and well-being, as well as to 
equity in healthcare. It is also an acknowledgment of the important 
regulatory role government must play in facilitating the kind of collective 
action and shared responsibility that makes insurance affordable, 
accessible, and meaningful for everyone on equal terms. The moral 
mandate’s expressive force depends on the government’s ability to transform 
the culture of insurance and healthcare in ways that overcome the 
longstanding apathy, confusion, mistrust, or isolationist feelings generated 
by the harmful messages and norms that defined the pre-ACA healthcare 
market. 
 
 188. See Brandon, supra note 177. 
 189. The concept of a medical home is defined as a “cultivated partnership between the 
patient, family, and primary provider in cooperation with specialists and support from the 
community.” What is a Medical Home? Why is it Important?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/toolbox/Childrenstoolbox/BuildingMedicalHome/whyim 
portant.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
 190. See Stone, supra note 161, at 62-63 (“Insurance is a form of what Foucauldian 
scholars call ‘discipline,’ that is, a system of inculcating norms, supervising behavior, and 
enforcing compliance with norms . . . . [For example], [p]roponents of mandatory automobile 
liability insurance believe insurance ‘was a way of inculcating a sense of responsibility toward 
others, teaching the importance of careful driving, and compelling automobile owners to 
assume financial responsibility for the consequences of their driving.’”). 
 191. We see this at the federal level with an emphasis on preventive care, medical homes, 
and tools to encourage better patient education and communication by providers in patient 
self-management. This is also evident as stakeholders and exchange officials discuss how to 
not only make insurance accessible, but how to help newly insured consumers understand and 
realize its benefits, especially for those chronically uninsured populations who have already 
developed habits of delaying seeking care until it becomes too late. 
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C. Implications of the ACA’s Moral Mandate: Defining the Meaning of 
Choice 
Part V revealed how government can expressively influence decisions 
about health and safety, as well as high stakes financial decisions in the 
private market place, in the absence of legal enforcement or sanctions. 
Moreover, Part VI.B noted that private insurance companies were successful 
in their own marketing attempts to shape the meaning of having life 
insurance as a signal of responsibility. Both kinds of decisions are implicated 
by the ACA’s coverage requirement, which confronts consumers with a 
choice between purchasing insurance or paying the tax/penalty –– a choice 
with important health and financial implications. This part considers the 
ways in which the ACA’s expressive mandate to buy insurance may influence 
this choice. 
As should be clear from the above discussion, for many people a moral 
mandate does not necessarily create a new social meaning as much as it 
reflects the underlying attitudes of a community that already has a strong 
sense of personal responsibility to buy insurance and a willingness to 
participate in a system that ensures affordable healthcare coverage for 
all.192 For this group, the most important expressive function of the ACA is 
the government’s commitment to remove existing impediments and make 
the market more transparent and fair. This commitment is clearest when 
considering the private and public insurance reforms together –– the 
Medicaid expansion eliminated eligibility categories based on anachronistic 
assumptions of vulnerability and worth, and the mandate to buy insurance 
only applies to people who can afford to do so with the help of government 
subsidies and regulation designed to ensure affordability. In this way, the 
government signals to the public that it is using its power to fill in coverage 
gaps by addressing a collective action problem arising out of a fragmented 
healthcare system and dysfunctional individual insurance market, a problem 
that states have been unwilling or unable to solve. 
It also signals that government will serve an important coordinating 
function to ensure the kind of collective participation that is necessary to 
ensure the new market will work, with health exchanges serving as this 
coordinating mechanism. Thus the moral mandate is important, but as an 
affirmation and reflection of those beliefs that had previously been obscured 
or could not be actualized because of market and regulatory failures 
beyond individuals’ control. In this way, the ACA serves an important 
educative function –– explaining regulatory and market changes that will 
enable people to act in ways that are more consistent with their internal 
norms of personal and social responsibility. 
 
 192. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 362. 
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There are two groups of people for whom the expressive function may 
need to do heavier lifting. The first is the group commonly referred to as the 
“young and healthy.” This group is less likely to have dependents (that 
would have triggered the responsibility norm even pre-ACA), and may be 
less likely to appreciate the health and financial benefits of insurance. Yet 
attracting these “healthy” members is critical to achieving a diverse enough 
pool to keep rates affordable. Indeed, this group is considered a primary 
target of the mandate. For these reasons, creating a moral obligation to 
participate in the system may be more challenging. Here again, the ACA’s 
educative function about the importance of their participation is what gives 
the moral mandate expressive force, and there are two important educative 
components. The ACA is a good platform to try to debunk the myth that 
young means healthy or that these adults do not need to think about 
healthcare yet. For example, some of the stories told and statistics cited 
throughout the debate and in NFIB193 help illustrate this problem, though 
the constant rhetorical use of the label “young and healthy” likely 
undermines this message. 
An equally important challenge is for government to educate these 
groups about the serious health and financial stakes driving healthcare 
reform, and the fact that reforms to ensure affordable and meaningful 
coverage will only work with a significant collective commitment to 
participate in this new system. To decide to gamble by not buying insurance 
has profound implications for others’ ability to access insurance –– 
especially those most in need. In light of these social costs, one is not free, 
at least as a moral matter, to treat the decision to buy health insurance as 
an individual problem subject to one’s own cost-benefit analysis. As noted 
above, polling suggests some people already have an internal sense of 
fairness and appreciation for the collective good that might encourage them 
to comply with a mandate once they understand the implications. 
For those without this internal norm, or where this norm is not enough to 
overcome an unfavorable cost-benefit analysis, the ACA may still influence 
their behavior, by stigmatizing the failure to purchase insurance as free-
riding and not doing one’s fair share. To the extent the Obama 
Administration is successful at creating a market that is more accessible and 
affordable, more people will become insured. The social meaning of 
uninsurance changes if the promise of affordability is realized –– no longer 
will people be able to blame the market or government’s regulatory failures. 
Discerning a clear meaning may still be tricky though. Unless one admits to 
paying the assessment, lack of insurance could still mean that one cannot 
 
 193. Although it did not seem to penetrate the joint dissenters’ understanding of the 
problem, Ginsburg relies on such statistics heavily in her dissent on the commerce question. 
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting in part, concurring in part). 
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afford it. Evidence of the correct meaning may not be easily visible, and thus 
it may be more difficult to create the kind of stigmatizing effect that would 
influence behavior. In contrast to the case of underwater mortgages, there 
also may not be enough opportunities in the healthcare context for the kind 
of frequent shaming needed to increase the social cost of foregoing 
insurance. This is an example of how the complexity of the law can 
undermine its moral mandate in ways that make the message less powerful. 
The final category, and one that poses another significant challenge, is 
the group of people ideologically opposed to the ACA. Ideological 
opposition was salient in the political attacks on reform; these attacks 
reflected a struggle over the definition of social norms and the meaning of 
insurance and evidenced a deep philosophical divide about the proper role 
of government and individuals’ responsibility to the broader community. 
Opponents characterized the mandate as an invasion of individual liberty 
and threat to freedom; “freedom,” in turn, was defined as the freedom to 
not buy insurance or the kind of insurance required by government.194 If not 
buying insurance is a symbol of their resistance to government’s 
infringement on their liberty and government’s attempt to redefine social 
norms to “socialize” health risk, then the failure to buy insurance will not be 
stigmatizing and this group will not be vulnerable to social shaming on this 
basis. Depending on how deeply this philosophical opposition runs, this 
group is unlikely to be swayed by a moral mandate justified by how it serves 
the collective good. 
On the other hand, many of those ideologically opposed to the reform 
and the mandate, may have a strong internal sense of personal 
responsibility that would lead them to take advantage of the protections and 
subsidies offered in the new system once up and running. Much of the 
opposition to the reform seemed based on wrong information about the law 
–– for example, that it was a federal takeover that would install death panels 
and hurt Medicare beneficiaries.195 In fact, polls and surveys show a 
 
 194. Proponents have challenged the reality of this construction, arguing that meaningful 
liberty includes health and that real freedom to get and pay for healthcare cannot exist without 
government regulation of markets that make insurance affordable and meaningful. 
 195. See Angie Drobnic Holan, Top 5 Falsehoods about the Health Care Law, 
POLITIFACT.COM (Jun. 27, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/ 
2012/jun/27/top-5-falsehoods-about-health-care-law/ (listing as the top five false claims 
about health reform that it is a government takeover of healthcare, that people could be jailed 
for not buying insurance, that the law rations care and denies treatments, and that it would 
create “death panels”). But see Sidney D. Watson, Metaphors, Meaning, and Health Reform, 
54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1313, 1314 (2010) (noting that some statements, for instance people 
speaking out about “death panels,” “government rationing” and “getting government out of 
Medicare” do not necessarily reflect ignorance about health reform; rather these words are 
metaphors that reflect the moral values of those opposing reform). 
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disconnect between people’s opposition to the health reform law proposed 
by Obama, especially when phrased as support for “Obamacare” or the 
“Affordable Care Act,” and their support for many of the same consumer 
protections and market reforms when asked about these outside of the 
context of the ACA.196 More importantly, when people are given information 
that educates them about the various reform proposals and they are 
encouraged to engage in a meaningful dialogue about the strengths and 
weaknesses of different approaches outside of the political context (like the 
explosive town hall meetings led by law-makers), people’s positions change 
in ways that often defy typical partisan divides.197 
Now that the legal fate of reform has been settled, and the polarizing 
rhetoric is starting to die down, policy-makers and consumer organizations 
can do the kind of outreach that will engage the public in these more 
constructive ways. As we move into implementation, it should be easier to 
ensure that people receive more objective and accurate information about 
the ACA and how it will impact them.198 This paves the way for the ACA to 
serve an educative function that, if successful, may reveal people’s true 
preferences as their own sense of personal and familial responsibility leads 
them to take advantage of the new subsidies and legal protections that 
empower them to purchase health insurance on the exchanges.199 Indeed, 
one of the criticisms of Republican or conservative opposition was that it was 
 
 196. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: MARCH 2012, at 10 (2012), 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8285-F.pdf [hereinafter KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 
MARCH 2012] (“One of the consistent contradictions in public opinion on the ACA is this: 
while the law as a whole has never gained majority support, its component parts – from the 
relatively narrow to the core and comprehensive – have been consistently popular over the 
past two years, with the glaring exception of the individual mandate. And many provisions of 
the law are popular even among Republicans.”). 
 197. See, e.g., HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL CALIFORNIANS, supra note 179. 
 198. See KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL MARCH 2012, supra note 196, at 6. (“[F]or the 
average American, the ACA is not yet real. Despite passage, and because of the longer term 
implementation framework, for many it seems to remain a remote political debate, one of 
many taking place against the backdrop of a public clearly cynical about the capacities of its 
political leaders. And from that perspective, the widespread level of confusion Americans 
express over the law is less surprising.”). The poll also notes continued misperceptions about 
the law, including 36% who believe that the law creates a government panel to make end-of-
life decisions for people on Medicare, also known as the “death panels.” Id. at 7. Only a little 
over half of those polled were familiar that the law provisions that prove generally more 
popular with the public, such as the basic benefits package, subsidies, guaranteed issue, tax 
credits to small businesses, no cost sharing for preventive services, and a medical loss ratio 
that assures a certain percentage of premiums are spent on medical care. Id. 
 199. See id. (finding that of those opposing health reform, a larger proportion say this is 
based in part on their displeasure with the direction of the country or government, than say it 
is based on what they know about the law, and that division over the ACA reflects a partisan 
divide). 
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hypocritical –– the mandate embodied a notion of personal responsibility 
that seemed quintessentially Republican, and which, not surprisingly, 
originated out of a conservative think tank.200 
In fact, we have seen these kinds of trends at the state level among 
officials who have initially resisted health expansion but then ultimately 
embraced it. For example, when first enacted Medicaid was vigorously 
resisted by some states, but today it has 100% state participation. And we 
are starting to see this unfold in the case of states deciding whether to 
participate in the Medicaid expansion or establish health benefit exchanges. 
Even some of the most vocal state opponents to reform are coming to terms 
with the reality of their options: states can participate in a system that allows 
them to benefit from generous federal funding to expand healthcare for their 
constituents, while at the same time allowing them to retain a great deal of 
control over system design; if not, states risk being viewed by their 
constituents as shirking a moral responsibility to help ensure the health and 
safety of its people, and they ultimately relinquish significant control of their 
citizens’ access to private insurance to the federal government.201 
But attempts to win over ideological opponents will be challenging. As 
Professor Sidney Watson has explained in her paper, Metaphors, Meaning, 
and Health Reform,202 lawmakers cannot expect that simply educating 
people about the facts of healthcare reform will lead them to behave 
rationally –– either in their own best interest or for the collective good. 
Rather lawmakers must be conscious about framing, tailoring their 
messages in a way that resonates with these groups’ own moral values.203 
VII.  CONCLUSION: CONCEIVING THE ACA AFTER NFIB 
The theme of “choice” has played a critical role in the health reform 
debate and legal challenges. Its importance in NFIB is clear as it determined 
the fate of both the public and private insurance parts of reform. It was used 
by the Court to save the law, but it also underscored an uncertainty that 
could undermine reform’s success. 
The implications of choice are perhaps more prominent in the other big 
substantive question the Court took up –– whether the Medicaid expansion 
was constitutional. The Medicaid expansion was structured as an 
amendment, which meant that continued participation in Medicaid (and 
thus a state’s existing Medicaid funding) was contingent on the state’s 
 
 200. Michael Cooper, Conservatives Sowed Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only to Spurn It 
Later, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/health/policy/ 
health-care-mandate-was-first-backed-by-conservatives.html?_r=0. 
 201. Ezra Klein, A Medicaid Offer too Good to Refuse, WASH. POST, July 3, 2012, at A12. 
 202. See generally Watson, supra note 195, at 1313. 
 203. Id. at 1314-15. 
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participation in the expansion.204 It was successfully challenged under the 
Tenth Amendment as coercive because the Court found that the states did 
not have a “genuine choice” about whether to participate.205 Choice was 
also important in crafting the remedy: the Court held that this constitutional 
violation could be remedied simply by ruling that the expansion was not an 
amendment to the program enforceable by threat of withdrawal of existing 
Medicaid funds.206 It relied on a severability clause in the Medicaid Act to 
preserve the expansion as a true choice for the states (also termed the “red-
state” option) rather than taking the dissent’s approach to strike down the 
entire expansion and eliminating the ability for any state to participate.207 
After the decision, there was a flurry of speculation and questions by media, 
health advocates, and state officials about what this would mean for the fate 
of reform: Now that states had a choice to participate, would this undermine 
reform goals?208 
Unlike the Medicaid coercion holding, the Court’s decision to uphold 
the mandate under the taxing power did not create new choice in the law. It 
merely reflected a legal reality and counter narrative about the choice that 
existed prior to NFIB, but did not get much attention. NFIB’s decision 
implicitly and explicitly reflects assumptions about consumer decision-
making that underscores uncertainty about the ACA’s goals of increased 
insurance coverage, in light of this element of choice. To the extent that 
NFIB changes the reform narrative to one that emphasizes choice, this could 
undermine reform enrollment goals. But the federal government, in 
conjunction with state and private partners, can leverage the expressive 
power of the ACA to educate people about the reciprocal benefits and 
responsibilities that are critical for expanding affordable care and to shape 
new norms that reflect a collective commitment to make the system work. 
Indeed, government must successfully define the meaning of the choice 
provided in the ACA in a way that instills this moral obligation and sense of 
shared responsibility if healthcare reform is to succeed. 
  
 
 204. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606-07. 
 205. Id. at 2603-05 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., and Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); Id. at 2657-66 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 206. Id. at 2602-07 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., and Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); Id. at 2642 
(opinion of Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are Still Unsure About Medicaid 
Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, at A17; Aaron Carroll, Why Medicaid expansion is key 
part of health reform, CNN.COM (July 5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/opinion/ 
carroll-medicaid-expansion/index.html. 
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